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Abstract
This paper studies responses to high-stakes incentives arising from early ability
tracking. We use three complementary research designs exploiting di↵erences in
school track admission rules at the end of primary school in Germany’s early ability
tracking system. Our results show that the need to perform well to qualify for a
better track raises students’ math, reading, listening, and orthography skills in
grade 4, the final grade before students are sorted into tracks. Evidence from self-
reported behavior suggests that these e↵ects are driven by greater study e↵ort but
not parental responses. However, we also observe that stronger incentives decrease
student well-being and intrinsic motivation to study.
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1 Introduction
To what extent is educational achievement shaped by student incentives? Several studies
have documented that students’ investments into education at the secondary and post-
secondary level strongly respond to various incentives, such as the returns to education
(e.g., Jensen, 2010; Abramitzky and Lavy, 2014). However, salient and high-powered
incentives often exist already in primary school, for example in the form of performance
requirements for admission to selective schools or promotion to the next grade. Little is
known about whether and to what extent these incentives a↵ect educational investments
and early skill acquisition.
This paper o↵ers the first causal evidence on the implications of high-stakes incen-
tives for primary school students. Specifically, we examine how primary school students
respond to incentives arising from early ability tracking—the allocation of students to
di↵erent secondary school tracks based on previous achievement. We address the follow-
ing questions: Does the need to perform well to qualify for a better secondary school
track a↵ect the skill development of young children in primary school? What are the
roles of study e↵ort and parental responses? And, are there any downsides to high-
stakes incentives, such as potentially harmful e↵ects for student well-being or intrinsic
motivation?
In order to shed light on these questions, we exploit the context of the German
school system, a rigorous early tracking system where children are allocated to di↵erent
hierarchically ordered school tracks at the end of primary school, as young as age 10. This
setting is uniquely suited to analyze how children respond to incentives and whether this
translates into achievement gains for two reasons: First, we will provide evidence that
children view allocation to a secondary school track as important and exhibit strong
preferences for higher tracks. Second, the specific rules governing the allocation to school
tracks di↵er across German federal states and have undergone sharp changes in the past
decade. While in some states students receive binding track recommendations at the
end of primary school based on prior achievement, other states allow parents to freely
choose a school track regardless of the recommended track. Granting parents free choice
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e↵ectively reduces incentives for children to perform well in primary school in order to be
allowed to attend a higher track. This gives rise to between- and within-state variation
in strong performance incentives for primary school children, which we can study.
We use the variation in performance incentives in three complementary research de-
signs drawing on various data sources. The first is a di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DiD) design
that exploits the fact that two states have repealed binding track recommendations in
2012. Specifically, we contrast student performance at the end of primary school in grade
4 (the final grade before tracking) in states that repealed binding track recommendations
with states that did not change their rules, before and after the repeal. For this approach,
we use student-level data from the National Assessment Study (NAS), which adminis-
tered standardized math, reading, and listening tests to state-representative samples of
around 25,000 grade 4 students covering all German federal states in 2011 and 2016.
In a second research design, we leverage the fact that student performance is not
graded until grade 3 and track recommendations are only based on performance in grade
4. As a result, we expect the performance incentives from binding track recommendations
to be less salient in grades below grade 4. To estimate e↵ects, we thus compare test score
gains between grades 2 and 4 in states with and without binding track recommendations.
While this approach only makes use of between-state variation in rules, flexibly control-
ling for lower grade test scores allows us to account for potential confounding arising
from di↵erences in the student population and schooling environment between states.
Importantly, it turns out that estimates remain virtually unchanged without lower grade
test score controls as long as class-level averages of a limited set of students’ family back-
ground characteristics (e.g., parental education and migration background) are included
to control for di↵erences in the socio-economic composition of classes. This strongly sup-
ports the assumption that our between-state comparison of test score gains is not biased
by omitted variables correlated with free track choice.1 The data for the second approach
come from starting cohort 2 of the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS).
This is a student-level panel, following a nationally representative sample of students who
1We also show that, conditional on pre-determined family background controls, there are no test
score di↵erences in grades 1 and 2 between states with and without free track choice.
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entered primary school in 2012 over time.
In a third approach, we combine the DiD and lagged valued-added approach to address
any potentially remaining biases in the previous designs. For a subset of states, we have
state-level data on the distribution of proficiency levels (measured in 5 categories) in
math and reading in grade 3 for the same cohorts that were tested in grade 4 in the NAS.
This allows for a di↵erence-in-di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DiDiD) approach, which identifies
e↵ects from within-cohort changes in the distribution of proficiency levels between grades
3 and 4, across pre- and post-repeal cohorts, between repeal and no-repeal states.
We find across all research designs that tracking incentives have a substantial impact
on academic achievement of primary school students. Estimates from the DiD and lagged
value-added designs based on student-level data indicate that free track choice lowers stu-
dent test scores in grade 4 by between 0.10-0.14 standard deviations in math, 0.06-0.08
in reading, 0.09 in listening, and 0.2 in orthography. With the DiDiD design, based on
state-level data, we find that free track choice consistently lowers the share of students
scoring at higher proficiency levels. For example, the share of students scoring at or above
the 3rd of 5 proficiency level decreases in response to free track choice from grade 3 to
4 relative to una↵ected cohorts by 7.59 percentage points in math and 6.45 percentage
points in reading. Since none of the standardized tests we use are incentivized — the test
scores do not count towards students’ grades — we are confident that our estimates cap-
ture e↵ects on students’ acquired skills, rather than di↵erences in test-taking behaviour
(see, e.g., Jalava et al., 2015; Levitt et al., 2016).2 E↵ects can be found throughout the
entire achievement distribution, however, low-achieving students show the strongest re-
sponse, suggesting that tracking incentives for primary school students can reduce gaps
in early skill acquisition.
Detailed survey measures of student and parental behaviour in the NEPS data allow
us to investigate the mechanisms that help to explain these results. In line with an e↵ort-
based explanation, we show that with binding track recommendations 4th graders invest,
on average, 13 minutes more per day (a 25% di↵erence) into homework and private study.
2Also note that neither the NEPS nor NAS test results are revealed to schools.
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Again, low-achieving students show the strongest response. At the same time, there is no
evidence that greater study e↵ort is a result of parental behaviour; parents do not report
to help students with homework or hire private tutors more frequently with binding
track recommendations. Instead, parents enforce stricter rules for studying and monitor
their children more closely when track recommendations are not binding. This behaviour
possibly reflects parental responses to students’ lower study e↵ort and achievement when
they are not induced to study more by binding track recommendations. We therefore
conclude that the achievement e↵ects are likely driven by students’ e↵ort responses to a
type of high-stake incentive that arises in many education systems.
The achievement gains due to binding track recommendations, however, come at the
cost of a reduction in students’ self-reported well-being. We provide direct evidence that
this results from 4th grade students being more anxious about their school performance
and future. Moreover, external incentives appear to crowd-out intrinsic motivation, an
e↵ect that persists after grade 4, when students have been allocated to a secondary school
track. We thus identify potentially harmful side-e↵ects of high-stakes incentives that need
to be traded o↵ against their immediate achievement e↵ects.
The present paper contributes to a growing literature on the role of incentives in
education. Studies at the secondary and post-secondary level have demonstrated older
students’ responsiveness in educational decisions and achievement to a variety of incen-
tives.3 Yet little is known about whether the same applies to younger students in primary
school for whom the benefits of education are less tangible and who are less patient (see
Sutter et al., 2019, for a review). Knowledge about the responsiveness of primary school
students is particularly important since achievement gaps open up early (see, e.g., Heck-
3For example, empirical studies demonstrate achievement e↵ects in response to changes in the returns
to education (Abramitzky and Lavy, 2014; Chadi et al., 2019), direct financial incentives for academic
performance, such as merit scholarships or financial rewards for passing grades (Henry and Rubenstein,
2002; Kremer et al., 2009; Pallais, 2009; Angrist et al., 2009; Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Leuven et al.,
2010; Jackson, 2010a; Behrman et al., 2015; Burgess et al., 2016; Barrow and Rouse, 2018; Montalban,
2019). There are also studies that point to the importance of non-financial incentives, such as di↵erences
in the value of leisure (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2008; Metcalfe et al., 2019), high school exit
exams (Jürges et al., 2005), exogenous changes in one’s GPA (Hvidman and Sievertsen, 2019), academic
probation (Lindo et al., 2010), or high school campus leave policies that are conditional on academic
performance (Lichtman-Sadot, 2016). Schildberg-Hörisch and Wagner (2020) review the experimental
studies on non-financial incentives.
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man, 2006) and earlier investments are typically assumed to be more e↵ective because of
the dynamic complementarity of skills (Heckman and Cunha, 2007).
To the best of our knowledge, only two previous studies have investigated achievement
e↵ects of incentives for primary school students. Fryer (2011) and Bettinger (2012) both
study randomized cash incentives for primary school students in disadvantaged school
districts in the US and find mixed results for incentives up to $60. While Bettinger
(2012) finds an impact of financial incentives on math but no impact on reading, social
science, or science outcomes, Fryer (2011) finds no e↵ect on either math or reading test
scores. Importantly, these experimental studies do not allow to discriminate between
two potential explanations for the largely null findings, each carrying di↵erent policy
implications: First, low-stakes or purely financial incentives may be insu cient to mo-
tivate young students to exert more e↵ort. Second, primary school students may lack
understanding of the educational production function. That is, increased study e↵ort
does not necessarily raise achievement due, for example, to young students not knowing
how to learn e↵ectively. The variation in high-stakes incentives in our setting – which
is not viable in experimental studies due to ethical concerns – allows us to detect e↵ects
that are consistent with the first and refute the second explanation for previous null
findings. Given strong enough incentives, primary school students exert more e↵ort and
greater e↵ort is productive in the sense that it improves achievement. Our findings are
particularly remarkable because they show that not only do young children respond to
incentives, they are significantly motivated by a reward that lies half a year or more in
the future.
Our results also yield an important lesson for the broad literature on the implications
of school systems that separate students based on prior achievement. According to PISA
2012, an average 43 percent of 15-year-old students in OECD countries attend schools
where previous academic performance is considered for admission OECD (2013).4 Two
4In the majority of OECD countries, separation takes the form of explicit between-school tracking
(OECD, 2013), whereas some school systems mostly track students within schools (e.g., those of Canada
and the US). Achievement-based separation also exists in the form of selective schools where admission
is based on previous academic achievement (e.g., grammar schools in the UK or Boston and New York
City’s elite exams schools), fee-charging private schools that grant discounts based on students’ previous
academic achievement, or centralized school assignment mechanisms where priority at over-subscribed
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main questions that researchers have asked concerning selective schools are: What is
the benefit to the student of attending a selective school (Damon, 2010; Jackson, 2010b;
Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2014; Dobbie and Fryer, 2014; Clark and Del Bono, 2016; Dustmann
et al., 2017; Borghans et al., 2019), and what is the benefit of a selective system as a whole
on achievement after students have been allocated to di↵erent schools (see, e.g., Hanushek
and Wössmann, 2006; Atkinson et al., 2006; Guyon et al., 2011; Matthewes, 2020). Our
results point to an important e↵ect that has been missed in these analyses, namely that
achievement-based selection can improve student achievement before selection takes place
by raising incentives to study.5 This e↵ect has to be taken into account when evaluating
school systems with di↵erent degrees of selectivity. Our results suggest, for example, that
even if students do not benefit from attending selective schools (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu
et al., 2014; Dustmann et al., 2017), the presence of selective schools alone can enhance
skill acquisition if strong preferences for them induces greater study e↵ort.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional context of Ger-
many’s school system and Section 3 details the empirical strategies. Section 4 describes
the data, Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.
schools is partly based on academic achievement (e.g., Hungary, Boston, Chicago and New York City’s
public schools).
5Hanushek and Wössmann (2006) compare achievement gains between the end of primary school
(before students have been tracked) and grades 7 and 8 in tracking and non-tracking school systems.
Hence, their estimation strategy absorbs any achievement gains of tracking that occur before students
are tracked. Matthewes (2020) follows a similar estimation strategy by comparing test score gains after
students have been tracked between German federal states with three versus two separate school tracks.
Guyon et al. (2011) exploit a reform in Northern Ireland that sharply increased the proportion of students
admitted into elite schools after grade 6 from one year to the next. However, by comparing cohorts right
before and after implementation of the reform, it is unclear whether these students anticipated the sudden
increase in the probability to be selected for elite education. Hence, these students possibly only had
limited ability to respond in earlier grades. Another related strand of the literature studies long-run
e↵ects (e.g., on educational attainment and wages in adulthood) of several de-tracking school reforms in
Europe (see, e.g., Aakvik et al., 2010; Meghir and Palme, 2005; Pekkala Kerr et al., 2013; Canaan, 2020).
Since these studies measure outcomes in adulthood and the de-tracking reforms did not abolish tracking
but merely delayed it to higher grades in secondary school (and often coincided with other major changes




In this section, we will give a concise description of the German school system for the
academic years 2010/11-2016/17, with a focus on those aspects that are most relevant
for understanding the transition from primary to secondary school.
Figure 1 provides a stylised overview of primary and secondary education in Germany.
Primary school covers grades 1 through 4, or in some federal states grades 1 to 6, and
assignment is based solely on whether a student lives within a school’s catchment area.6
At the end of primary school, students are allocated to di↵erent, vertically ordered school
tracks, which educational researchers consider one of the most important events in a per-
son’s educational biography (Baumert et al., 2010). The placement in a school track after
primary school can be viewed as permanent, as few students move between school tracks
(particularly in the upward direction) before they have completed a track.7 There are
two types of tracking systems in Germany. The first is a three-tiered system, with three
school types: Hauptschule, Realschule, and Gymnasium. We designate these tracks ‘ba-
sic’, ‘intermediate’, and ‘academic’, respectively. Education in the academic track lasts
eight to nine years (grades 5-12/13) and prepares students for higher education. Educa-
tion in the basic and medium track, on the other hand, lasts five (grades 5-9) and six
years (grades 5-10), respectively, is less academic and prepares students for an apprentice-
ship in blue-collar or white-collar occupations. The second system is a two-tiered system
where the basic and intermediate track are combined into one comprehensive school. In
grades 5 and 6, students in comprehensive schools are not grouped by ability. However,
some comprehensive schools form track-specific classes from grade 7 onward and o↵er the
same degrees as the basic, intermediate, and academic track schools.8
[Figure 1 about here]
6Shure (2019) reports that based on anecdotal evidence from speaking to relevant Ministries of
Education in four German states, on average less than one percent of families request that their child
attend a primary school that is not the school to which they were assigned. Unfortunately, no o cial
statistics are collected.
7Dustmann et al. (2017) show that only 2% of students switch tracks between grades 5-9 based on
the School Census for Bavaria and Hesse. However, once students complete one of the lower tracks (i.e.,
after grade 9 or 10) with good grades, it is quite common to continue in a higher track.
8See Matthewes (2020) for more details on comprehensive schools in Germany.
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School tracks in both systems are clearly ordered hierarchically, a fact that is also
reflected in teacher salaries, which tend to increase with the school track.9 School tracks
also imply di↵erences in social status. According to sociological studies, students assigned
to the lowest school track may generally be considered as socially disadvantaged (Bos
et al., 2010), they also su↵er from social contempt and lack of social recognition (Wellgraf,
2014) and self-stigmatize as losers (Knigge, 2009). Primary school students are aware of
the importance of school track assignment and tend to have a strong preference for the
academic track in particular. Figure 2 shows how primary school students view the
di↵erent tracks.10 More than 60% of 3rd graders expect the job prospects of academic
track graduates to be very good, compared to less than 18% for the basic track (Panel
A).11 If these students could freely choose their school degree, 78% state that they would
choose the academic degree and only around 6% the basic degree (Panel B).
[Figure 2 about here]
The rules governing which track children can attend after primary school di↵er across
states and have undergone sharp changes in the last decade. However, the basic struc-
ture is the same across states. There are no formal exit exams at the end of primary
school, rather the primary school issues a secondary school track recommendation for
each student which is generally guided by the student’s abilities and their performance
in the last grade of primary school.12 The main di↵erence between states is whether this
recommendation is binding or not. Whereas in some states students cannot attend a
9Teacher salaries di↵er from state to state, but in all states where teachers are still employed as
civil servants (Beamte), academic track teachers are paid according to salary grade (Besoldungsstufe)
A13. Basic track teachers are generally paid according to salary grade A12, but some states further
di↵erentiate between intermediate and basic track teachers. To get an sense of the salary di↵erences
across school tracks, consider North Rhine-Westphalia, the state which employs the most teachers. In
2017, the gross starting salary for a academic track teacher was 4,038 Euros and 3.459 Euros for an
intermediate track teacher, a 16.7% salary di↵erential.
10Figure 2 is based on data from starting cohort 2 of the NEPS, which will be introduced in Section
4.
11If we pool responses and standardize them to have mean zero and variance one, the average responses
by school track are -.38 SD, -.24 SD, and .60 SD for the basic, intermediate, and academic track,
respectively.
12The factors determining recommendations di↵er across states. Bavaria and Saxony, for example,
have specific GPA cuto↵s, while other states do not specify the exact requirements to get a recommen-
dation for a particular school. For more details on these rules see Helbig and Nikolai (2015). For a
discussion of the factors teachers consider for their recommendations see Baumert et al. (2010).
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higher track than recommended,13 other states allow parents to freely choose a secondary
school track for their child regardless of the recommendation.14 Table 1 shows which
states had binding track recommendations for the school years 2010/11-2016/17. In 7
out of 16 states, the school’s recommendation was binding in 2010, however, of these
seven states, three changed the rules between 2011 and 2013 and decided to give parents
free school track choice.15 These are North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, and
Saxony-Anhalt.
[Table 1 about here]
3 Empirical approach
3.1 Di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DiD)
We employ three identification strategies to estimate responses to high-stakes incentives,
which are tailored to the three available datasets that will be discussed in Section 4. The
first identification strategy takes advantage of the repeal of the binding track assignment
policy in some states in a di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DiD) framework. Our first di↵erence
compares student achievement in states that repealed binding track assignment (repeal
states) to states that did not change the school track allocation rules (no-repeal states).
The second di↵erence compares cohorts of students before (pre-repeal) and after the
binding track assignment were removed (post-repeal). In our baseline empirical exercise,
we estimate the following regression:
Yisc =  1TCsc + ↵s + ↵c +  2Xisc + ✏isc (1)
where Yisc is an outcome of student i in cohort c in state s, TCsc is an indicator for
13In case of conflict between the recommendation and the parents’ wishes, some states allow students
to take a special test whose outcome determines whether a student is allowed to attend the higher track.
14Parents can always opt for a lower track than recommended, also in states with binding track
recommendations.
15Note that even with free track choice, teachers still have to recommend tracks for each student.
Therefore parents receive the same type of information on their children’s academic achievement with
or without free track choice. This is important as there is evidence that performance information inter-
ventions for parents can have positive impacts on children (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2020).
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track choice which takes on the value 1 if state s has free track choice and varies at the
state-cohort level. To account for di↵erences across states and across time, we include
state (↵s) and cohort (↵c) fixed e↵ects.16 Xis is a vector of various school-, class-, and
student-level characteristics. These include age at test, a rich set of parental background
variables, for example, parental education and occupation, books at home, and migration
background. In the most parsimonious specifications, Xisc only includes test booklet fixed
e↵ects because test items di↵ered across students.17
The identifying assumption is that the removal of binding track assignment is orthog-
onal to potential outcomes of students in repeal and no-repeal states in the post-repeal
period. In other words, we assume that if binding track assignment would have stayed
in place, student outcomes would have evolved similarly in states that did and did not
change their track recommendation policy. A typical concern for the validity of this
assumption is self-selection into treatment. However, track assignment policies vary at
the federal state level and across-state mobility in Germany is relatively low. Hence, the
potential for selection bias due to sorting of students based on track assignment poli-
cies is very small in this context. Nevertheless, we do find that repealing binding track
assignment is correlated with several student characteristics. For this reason, we also
estimate specifications where Xis includes a rich set of school-, class-, and student-level
characteristics to ensure the comparability of students within states over time, because
each cohort comes from a di↵erent sample of schools, which might di↵er due to sampling
variability.
Another concern is that the repeal of binding track assignment partly overlapped with
other state-level changes, for example, due to other schooling reforms. During our study
time period, three major education policies were implemented that could have a↵ected
primary student achievement di↵erently across states. These are the expansion of early
public childcare and full-day schooling, and the inclusion of special-needs students in
16Since both repeal states we consider removed binding track assignment in the same year and there
were no changes in the no-repeal states, we do not run into the negative weights problem that can
bias two-way fixed e↵ects regressions in the presence of e↵ect heterogeneity (see, e.g., Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfoeuille, 2020).
17See Section 4 for more details on this.
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regular schools (Inklusion).18 The implementation of these reforms was relegated to
the federal states, which, in turn, mostly relegated it to the municipalities or individual
schools. As a result, the timing and extent of implementation di↵ers widely, not only
across but also within states.19 To account for these policy changes, we include controls
for years spent in public childcare, whether a school o↵ers full-day schooling, and the
share of special-needs students in class. Controlling for the potential policy e↵ects this
way does not change our conclusions.
3.2 Lagged valued-added model
The identification assumption for the DiD approach is that the repeal of binding track
assignment was not accompanied by other changes to the education system that a↵ected
student achievement in repeal states di↵erently relative to no-repeal states. We provide
several pieces of evidence suggesting that the coe cient  1 in equation (1) indeed mea-
sures the e↵ects of free track choice, as opposed to other school policies. However, to
further address concerns regarding such potential threats to identification, we also employ
an alternative approach that relies on a source of variation less susceptible to bias arising
from time-varying schooling policies. Specifically, we leverage within-student variation
and compare test score gains between grades 2 and 4 in states with and without free
track choice. The basic idea is that track assignment rules become more salient towards
the end of primary school since students are not graded until grade 3 and track recom-
mendations are supposed to only be based on grade 4 performance. Hence, assignment
rules that govern the transition to secondary school tracks are less likely to a↵ect student
behaviour in the lower grades of primary school when students do not yet receive quan-
titative performance appraisals that make relative abilities salient. By conditioning on
grade 2 achievement, we can account for potential confounding arising from di↵erences in
the student population or the schooling environment across choice and no-choice states.
18Note that other school reforms, such as the introduction of central exit exams in the academic track
and the introduction (and subsequent abolition) of university tuition fees, were all implemented at the
secondary school or university level. Hence, they are unlikely to a↵ect achievement in primary school.
For an overview of these reforms see Helbig and Nikolai (2015) or Marcus and Zambre (2019).
19In Appendix C, we provide more details on these policy reforms.
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For this approach, we use longitudinal student-level data for the cohort that tran-
sitioned to secondary school in 2016. Importantly, the variation here stems from dif-
ferences in 4th grade achievement between states which had binding track assignment
in 2016 (Bavaria, Saxony, and Thuringia) and all states with free track choice in 2016.
Free-track-choice states include Baden-Württemberg and Saxony-Anhalt, which repealed
the binding track recommendation policy. The variation for this identification strategy is
thus complementary to that used in the DiD design, which is mainly based on the com-
parison of achievement in pre- and post-repeal periods in repeal states. We will estimate
the following lagged valued-added model that is often used in the economics of education
literature:
Yis4 =  1TCs +  Yis2 +  2Xis + ✏is (2)
where Yis4 is the outcome variable of interest of student i in state s measured in grade
4, TCsc is an indicator equal to 1 if state s has track choice and 0 otherwise, as in
equation (1); Yis2 is a vector of lagged achievement measures from grade 2. Finally,
Xis is a vector of various school-, class-, and student-level characteristics that includes,
for example, the degree of urbanization of the school district, student-teacher ratio, age
composition of the teaching sta↵, number of instruction hours in math and German, class
size, student composition (e.g., the share of low- and high-SES students), and student-
level demographics (parental education, reported books at home, number of siblings,
migration background, gender, premature birth, timing of primary school enrolment,
learning disabilities).
The key identifying assumption for this approach is that test score gains between
grades 2 and 4 in states with free track choice form a valid counterfactual to test score
gains in states with binding track assignment. To lend credibility to this assumption, we
will show in Section 5 that there are virtually no baseline test score di↵erences in grades
1 and 2 between choice and no-choice states once we condition on a set of pre-determined
characteristics, such as the share of high-SES children in a school. Moreover, we do not
find evidence for di↵erences in test score gains in grade 2 (i.e., the di↵erence in test scores
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between grades 2 and 1) across choice and no-choice states.20 This strongly suggests that
student achievement levels and potential achievement gains in choice and no-choice states
are comparable conditional on pre-determined controls for student demographics and the
learning environment.21
However, even if choice and no-choice states are similar in terms of achievement levels
and gains up to grade 2, these states could di↵er in their capacities to raise achievement
in subsequent grades due to di↵erences in the learning environment. To test whether
potential di↵erences in schooling inputs across binding and nonbinding states confound
our e↵ects, we draw on unusually rich data on the school environment. We have detailed
information on the schooling environment, such as the time per week devoted to certain
tasks in class, teachers’ job satisfaction, their perception of the quality of the school
management etc. In the robustness section we check that our results are not sensitive to
the inclusion of these variables.22
Most of the tests in the data we use for this approach were administered relatively
early in the school year and the timing of tests can di↵er widely within waves. In grade
4, for example, students were tested between November and January.23 In addition, the
beginning of the school year varies across states.24 For example, in 2015 the earliest state
(North Rhine-Westphalia) started school on August 11, while the last state (Bavaria)
20As a result, estimates of equation (2) with grade 4 test scores as outcomes are very similar regardless
of whether one includes test scores from grade 1, grade 2, or both as controls.
21Note that the typical problems identified in the literature with lagged value-added models are less
likely to matter in our case (see, e.g., Rothstein, 2010; Andrabi et al., 2011). One major concern is
that the error term could include the ability to learn faster. Such unobserved heterogeneity in learning
dynamics could result in a common individual-level component in the error term ✏it. However, our
treatment varies at the state level where selection based on unobserved ability to learn is unlikely to
play a role. This is supported by the fact that we find no di↵erences in baseline grade 1 tests scores
or grade 2 test scores gains once we condition on pre-determined characteristics. The second concern is
that test scores are inherently noisy measures of latent achievement which attenuates the coe cients on
lagged achievement and may bias the free-track-choice coe cient in the process. However, our results
are virtually unchanged if we exclude lagged achievement measures from (2), despite the fact that they
are strongly predictive of achievement in grade 4. This suggests that measurement error does not pose
a problem for estimating the free-track-choice coe cient.
22Many of these variables are potentially endogenous as they could be influenced by student behaviour
(e.g., time spent reviewing material in class). We therefore only consider them for robustness checks and
not for our main results.
23See Table A.1 for the timing of tests and surveys in the NEPS. Figure A.1 shows the distribution
of test dates by binding and nonbinding states.
24Table A.3 in the appendix reports the state-specific starts of the school years 2012/13, 2013/14, and
2015/16 when students were tested in grade 1,2 and 4, respectively.
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did not start until September 15. Combined with di↵erences in testing dates this means
that some students will have experienced up to 5.5 months of schooling in grade 4 when
tested, while others could have spent as little as 2.5 months in grade 4. To make tests
comparable and ensure that this does not confound our estimates, we proceed as follows:
We first regress tests scores on a cubic function of age at test, fixed e↵ects for the month
of the test,25 and a linear control for the day of the school start in the school year that
the test was administered. We then use the residuals from these regressions as outcome
variables.
3.3 Di↵erence-in-di↵erence-di↵erences (DiDiD)
In a third approach, we combine the DiD and lagged valued-added approach to address
any remaining potential biases. For a subset of states, we have state-level data on the
distribution of proficiency levels (measured in 5 categories) in math and reading in grade
3 for the same cohorts that were tested in grade 4 in the NAS (i.e., before and after the
repeal).26 This allows us to use each cohort’s own grade 3 proficiency level distribution
as a control for its grade 4 distribution in a di↵erence-in-di↵erences approach exploiting
the repeal of binding track recommendations. In practice, we perform double di↵erences:
one within cohorts (across grades 3 and 4) and one across cohorts (pre- and post-repeal).
The idea is again that binding track recommendations should have a stronger e↵ect on
incentives to perform well in grade 4 (where performance matters for recommendations)
than in grade 3. Intuitively, the identifying assumption of this approach is that there are
no other factors a↵ecting pre- and post-repeal cohorts di↵erently between grades 3 and
4. We will refer to this approach as between-grade di↵erence-in-di↵erences (BG-DiD) to
distinguish it from the previous DiD approach that is only based on grade 4 performance
measures. The BG-DiD estimate can be obtained by taking mean di↵erences of the four
25We only have information on the month but not the exact day of testing. Hence, fixed e↵ects for
the month of the tests is the most flexible way to control for it.
26See Section 4 for more details on these data and their comparability to the NAS (which uses the
same proficiency level classification).
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cells defined by the two pre- and post-repeal cohorts in grades 3 and 4:
 ̂BG DiDl = (Ȳl,Post,4   Ȳl,P re,4)  (Ȳl,Post,3   Ȳl,P re,3) (3)
where Ȳlcg denotes the mean share of students scoring at or above proficiency level l
of cohort c (pre- or post-repeal) in grade g in repeal states. This approach addresses
potential confounds in the DiD design due to di↵erences across pre- and post-repeal
cohorts between repeal and no-repeal states. It also accounts for potential bias due to
di↵erences in potential achievement gains between states with and without free track
choice in the lagged value-added model. It should be noted that if tracking incentives
already a↵ect student performance in grade 3, this will biase BG-DiD estimates towards
zero.
The BG-DID approach can be made more robust by drawing on states that did not
switch to free track choice as an additional control group. The expanded di↵erence-in-
di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DiDiD) version of (3) amounts to the di↵erence between the
BG-DID estimate for repeal and no-repeal states:
 ̂DiDiDl = (Ȳl,Repeal,Post,4   Ȳl,Repeal,Pre,4)  (Ȳl,Repeal,Post,3   (Ȳl,Repeal,Pre,3)
  [(Ȳl,No repeal,Post,4   Ȳl,No repeal,Pre,4)  (Ȳl,No repeal,Post,3   Ȳl,No repeal,Pre,3)]
(4)
where the additional subscript s of Ȳlscg indexes repeal and no-repeal states.
The second di↵erence in the DiDiD design nets out any changes in proficiency levels
between cohorts and across grade-levels that are unrelated to the repeal of binding track
recommendations. This accounts, for example, for di↵erences in the scaling and definition
of proficiency levels across cohorts and grades.
For the BG-DiD and DiDiD approach only state-level data is available. Since we lack
additional covariates that vary within-cohorts at the state-level, four (eight) means have
to be estimated for the BG-DiD (DiDiD) approach. Regressions produce a perfect fit
15
with no residual variance in this case, which rules out inference.27
4 Data
4.1 National Assessment Study (NAS)
This study draws on three main sources for student-level data. First, for the DiD and
the DiDiD designs we use the National Assessment Study (NAS), which is designed to
produce representative test score data for all 16 German federal states.28 It is a repeated
cross-section and has been administered in 2011 and 2016, testing students at the end of
grade 4 (between May and July) in math and German (reading and listening). Tests were
administered by external sta↵ to around 25,000 students in both years, with each state
contributing roughly a similar number of students. Around 2,600 schools participated in
both waves combined. In each wave, random samples of schools were drawn to be at the
federal state level and within each school, one class was randomly selected for testing. Not
all students answered the same set of questions. Instead, schools were randomly assigned
booklets with di↵erent blocks of questions which contained a subset of the complete item
pool (also called ‘block design’).29 However, test items are spread over booklets in a
way that allows for the transformation of all tests on a common scale (for more details,
see Stanat et al., 2012). In addition to test score data, the NAS includes information
collected through surveys of the participating students, their parents, teachers and school
principals. While participation in the competence tests was mandatory in all sampled
classes in public schools, completion of the student questionnaire was mandatory only
in some states, and participation in the parent questionnaire was voluntary in all states.
As a result, participation rates for the student and parent questionnaire (83% and 74%,
respectively) are considerably lower than test participation, which is 98% and 94% for
27Randomization inference has limited applicability in this context since we only have data for one
repeal state (Baden Württemberg) and three no-repeal states (Schleswig-Holstein, Berlin, and Branden-
burg). With only three possible permutations of the data, the p-value is only interval-identified and the
lowest attainable interval is 0 to 0.25 (which our estimates always attain).
28For more details on the NAS data, see Stanat et al. (2012, 2017).
29For math the booklets were randomized within classes. For the language tests this was not possible
since the listening test required to play an audio recording to the entire class.
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waves 2011 and 2016, respectively. Table 2 presents student-level summary statistics,
pooling the data from 2011 and 2016.
4.2 German National Educational Panel Study - Starting Co-
hort 2 (NEPS)
The second data source for the lagged value-added approach is starting cohort 2 of the
German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS), an individual-level panel, following
a nationally representative sample of students who entered primary school in 2012 over
time. The data contain test scores and detailed information on family background and
the schooling environment, collected through student, teacher, principal and parent ques-
tionnaires between 2010 and 2018.30 Table A.1 shows the structure and timing of the
tests and surveys. Competence tests for the NEPS were administered in schools by ex-
ternal sta↵ and participation was voluntary. We will rely mostly on test scores in grade 1
(math, language, and science), grade 2 (math, reading, science, and non-verbal cognition)
and grade 4 (math, reading, and orthography).31
We have very detailed information on teachers and school principals. In addition to
demographic characteristics, these include teachers’ teaching philosophies, pedagogical
approaches, and classroom practices. We explain how we construct summary measures
based on this information to control for di↵erences in the schooling environment for
robustness checks in Appendix D.
4.3 National Orientation Tests (VERA-3)
Since 2008, students in all German federal states have taken the nationally-standardized
VERA-3 test in math and German language at the end of grade 3 (April-May) every
30See Blossfeld et al. (2011) for an overview. The NEPS originally started with a sample from the
population of children attending day-care facilities (Kindergarten) two years prior to regular school
enrollment in the year 2010/2011. However, the great majority of these children could not be followed
into primary school. Therefore, a new refreshment sample of first grade students was drawn in 2012/13.
It is the refreshment sample that we work with.
31Unfortunately, higher grade test scores are not available and in grade 3 neither math, reading, nor
orthography were tested.
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year.32 These tests are administered and rated by teachers based on detailed guidelines.
Test results do not count towards students’ grade. Instead, the stated goal of these tests
is to provide schools and teachers with feedback on their students’ competences compared
to other classes and schools (KMK, 2020). VERA-3 student-level data is generally not
made available to researchers, but some federal states publish results aggregated at the
state level. These are Schleswig-Holstein, North Rhein-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg,
Berlin, and Brandenburg.33 The aggregated data contain information on the fraction of
students scoring at one of five proficiency levels (below minimum level, minimum level,
regular level, regular plus level, optimal level) for each subject (KMK, 2013a,b,c). We
will use waves 2010 and 2015, which correspond to the same cohorts for which we have
NAS test scores in grade 4. Importantly, the NAS publishes comparable state-level data
on the distribution of students across proficiency levels based on the same scaling and
proficiency-level classification as VERA-3.34
4.4 Sample selection
Our analytic samples form the NAS, NEPS, and VERA-3 data are selected in the following
way.
Since survey participation was mostly voluntary for both the NEPS and the NAS,
background characteristics are missing for a considerable share of students, especially in
the NAS data. To increase sample size, we keep all observations with non-missing test
scores. Missing control variables are dealt with in following way: We create a separate
missing category for all categorical variables (e.g., parents’ work status). Missing values
for control variables that enter linearly in our estimations (e.g., parents’ years of educa-
32Students with diagnosed special educational needs and students who have lived in Germany for less
than a year are exempted.
33A request for state-level data for the other federal states was unsuccessful. Note that states’ per-
formance in VERA-3 is a politically sensitive topic as it allows to compare the performance of each
federal state’s educational system over time (recall that each federal state runs its own education sys-
tem). For this reason, most federal states do not published their VERA-3 results to prevent unwanted
discussion of their school policies. This is also reflected in data usage policies for the NEPS and NAS
microdata, which explicitly prohibt the publication of results that allow the identification of individual
federal states. Results can only be published for aggregated groups of federal states where at least two
states are combined to form a single meaningful group.
34The results are published in Stanat et al. (2012, 2017).
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tion) are imputed by the respective school-level average. In case a school has only missing
values for a variable (e.g., for some variables derived from the school principal or teacher
questionnaire), we impute missing values by the respective state-year average. We do not
impute any test scores or other variables that are used as outcome variables.
From the NAS and VERA-3 data, we exclude the state of North Rhine-Westphalia
because the decision to allow free track choice was made at the end of 2010, just a few
months before the first-wave tests were administered in 2011. Hence, it is unclear when
exactly students became aware of this change and whether they would have had enough
time to adjust their behaviour. Furthermore, the NAS administered easier tests for
students with severe mental or physical disabilities. We exclude these students because
it is unlikely that they respond to track assignment rules. From both datasets, we also
exclude classes with an unusually high share of special-needs students,35 as teaching can
be expected to be very di↵erent in these classes.
From the NEPS data, we further drop all observations from the state of Brandenburg.
Brandenburg has binding track recommendations, but besides Berlin it is the only state
where students transition to secondary school tracks after grade 6 and not after grade
4 as in all other states. Hence, it is their performance in grade 6 that matters most for
the track recommendation and whether one should expect student responses in grade 4
is unclear.
4.5 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 and 3 show descriptive statistics for the estimation samples for the NAS and
NEPS data, respectively.36 The NAS sample for the DiD analysis includes slightly less
than 48,000 students, out of which 11 percent are from repeal states. The NEPS sample
for the lagged value-added approach includes around 4,800 students, out of which 25
percent are from states without free track choice. Figure 4 shows the distribution of
35Specifically, we exclude classes with a special-needs student share above the 99% percentile, which
are classes with more than 40% special-needs students.
36Since some students did not participate in all grade 4 tests, the estimation samples for each outcome
will di↵er slightly. Here we report descriptives for all students with at least one non-missing test score
in grade 4
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proficiency levels in grades 3 and 4 for the cohorts of students who were in grade 4 in the
school years 2010/2011 and 2015/2016. Grade 3 data comes from VERA-3 and grade 4
data from the NAS. As can be seen, students are distributed roughly evenly across the
five proficiency levels, but the highest proficiency level represents the smallest group.
[Table 2 about here]
[Table 3 about here]
[Figure 4 about here]
5 Results
5.1 Does binding track assignment limit school track choice?
In this section, we provide direct evidence that binding track recommendations limit
students’ track choice by examining how track enrollment changes in response to granting
free choice. Figure 3 plots transition rates into the academic- and basic track based on
full-population, administrative data from the Federal Statistical O ce (German Federal
Statistical O ce, 2018).37 The solid line corresponds to the group of states who repealed
binding track recommendations in 2011 and the dashed line to states without changes to
their track assignment rules between 2005 and 2018.38
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 shows that transition rates for the academic and basic track di↵er across
repeal and no-repeal states but evolve in parallel in the years leading up to the repeal of
binding track assignment. In 2012, the year that parents were given free choice in repeal
37German Federal Statistical O ce (2015a). Allgemeinbildende Schulen: Fachserie 11, Reihe
1.https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/BildungForschungKultur/Schulen/Broschuer
eSchulenBlick.html.
38This figure excludes North Rhine-Westphalia because it changed its track recommendation policy in
2010 and it is also excluded from the DiD analysis below. Furthermore, in pooling the data from di↵erent
states all states receive the same weight. This is done to mirror the NAS sampling where all states
contribute approximately the same number of observations. Weighting states by student population
gives almost identical results.
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states, transitions into the academic track (basic track) noticeably increase (decrease) in
repeal states, with no corresponding changes in the no-repeal states. For the academic
track, the repeal seems to result in a one-time permanent rise in the share of students
attending the academic track, with no further changes in subsequent years. In contrast,
transitions into the basic track continue to decline in the post-repeal years.
Overall, Figure 1 shows that transition rates change mostly in repeal states and that
these changes coincide with the repeal of the binding track assignment. This is important
for our analysis for two reasons. First, binding track recommendations seem to be binding
constraints in the sense that their removal increases enrolment in the most preferred track
while reducing enrolment in the least desired track.39 This highlights their high-stake
nature. Second, since track decisions should be reflective of student achievement, similar
growth patterns in transition rates across repeal and no-repeal states prior to the repeal
are consistent with the common trend assumption of our DiD design.
5.2 Test score results
5.2.1 Di↵erence-in-di↵erences results
In Table 4, we present the main DiD results of estimating equation (1) based on the NAS
data. The dependent variables are grade 4 tests scores in math, reading, and listening,
which have all been standardized to have mean zero and unit variance to facilitate in-
terpretation. Column 1 shows results if we only control for state, year, and test booklet
fixed e↵ects. These suggest that repealing binding track recommendations is associated
with a decline in student performance in grade 4 of 0.17 standard deviations in math and
0.14 in reading and listening.
In column 2, we add several class-level controls to account for potential di↵erences
in the student composition over time. These include class-level averages of the following
variables: Reported books at home, parental years of education, and their highest Inter-
39Osikominu et al. (2020) provide further evidence that binding track assignment constrains sec-
ondary track choice by showing that parents were more likely to send their child to a higher track than
recommended by teachers after the repeal of binding track assignment in Baden-Württemberg.
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national Socio-Economic Index of Occupation Status (ISEI, Ganzeboom et al., 1992),40
indicators for migration background, non-native students, special-needs status, grade
repeater, and any learning disability (e.g., ADHD or dyslexia). The estimates in col-
umn 2 are somewhat smaller in size than the estimates in the first column, suggesting
that unadjusted DiD e↵ect sizes are slightly upward biased due to a relative decline in
the socio-economic composition of the sample of students in states that repealed bind-
ing track assignment. However, all estimates remain negative and statistically significant.
Free track choice is now estimated to lower test scores by 0.11 standard deviations in math
(p-value<0.01), 0.08 in reading (p-value<0.1), and 0.082 in listening (p-value<0.01).
[Table 4 about here]
In column 3, we control for potential di↵erences in schooling inputs within states
over time. These include controls for whether the school o↵ers a full-day program, is a
private school, instruction hours in math and German, school enrolment, and the work
experience of the teacher in each respective subject. Adding these controls has no e↵ect
on the estimates and their standard errors, suggesting that potential changes in the
schooling inputs do no confound our estimates.
Finally, in column 4, we add individual student-level controls. These include, in
addition to those used for the class-level averages, quadratic age controls, years spent
in public childcare, dummies for whether a student has skipped a grade, fathers’ and
mothers’ working status in four categories (not employed, part-time, full-time, or other),
and their birth countries (aggregated into five categories).41 Again, estimates are nearly
identical to those of column 2 and 3, suggesting that our class level controls are su cient
to remove any bias from di↵erences in the overall student composition over time.
In Appendix B, we provide additional robustness checks to rule out that our results
are caused by compositional di↵erences in the student population. We further check that
our results remain statistically significant when inference is based on standard errors
clustered at the state level.
40The ISEI measure of occupational prestige ranges from 16 (e.g., cleaning personnel) to 90 (judges).
41We create categories for the four most common countries of origin (Germany, Turkey, former Soviet
countries, and Poland) and pool all remaining countries into one category to avoid too small cell sizes.
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5.2.2 Value-added results
We now turn to the lagged valued-added model. Before we present our main results
based on this approach, we first check its validity. Specifically, one may worry about
other di↵erences between binding and non-binding states, even after controlling for grade
2 achievement. To address this concern, we provide two sets of tests for potential bias
based on the idea that binding track recommendations should only become salient towards
the end of primary school and therefore not a↵ect achievement in lower primary school
grades. First, we test for baseline di↵erences in lower-grade test scores between states with
and without free track choice after regression-adjusting for pre-determined characteristics.
Second, we test for di↵erential lower grade test score gains between choice and no-choice
states.42
Table 5 presents the results of these specification checks for average test scores in
Panel A and separately for each available test in the lower panels.43 Columns 1-2 report
the results from regressions of test scores in grade 1 on an indicator for free track choice
with and without further controls. Columns 3-4 show corresponding estimates for grade
2 test scores. Without any controls (columns 1 and 3), students in choice states have
consistently lower test scores in grades 1 and 2. These di↵erences are substantial, ranging
from 0.06 to 0.20 standard deviations, and are mostly statistically significant. However,
once we add school-, class-, and student-level controls (excluding lagged test scores) in
column 2 and 4, these test score gaps become small in magnitude, are never statistically
significant, and often reverse sign—consistent with no systematic di↵erences between
choice and no-choice states conditional on controls.
While this shows that there are no baseline test score di↵erences after regression-
adjusting, choice and no-choice states should also not di↵er in their potential test score
gains. As a falsification check, we test for di↵erences in grade 2 test score gains by con-
ditioning on cubic functions for all grade 1 test scores in column 5. Again, the estimated
42This test is similar in spirit to those proposed by Rothstein (2010).
43The samples in columns 1-2 include all observations with non-missing grade 1 test scores in the
respective subject. For the samples in columns 3-5, we further restrict the sample to observations with
non-missing grade 2 test scores in the respective subject. We do this to increase power, but results are
virtually the same if we use the smaller analytic sample for our main results that excludes students with
missing test scores in grade 4.
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coe cients are small in magnitude, ranging from -0.034 to 0.027, and are never statisti-
cally significant. In sum, we find choice and no-choice states to be balanced in the level
and growth of student achievement up to grade 2 after regression-adjusting.
In Table 6, we present our main results for the lagged value-added model of the e↵ect
of free track choice on test scores in grade 4. Results for math, reading, and orthography
are reported in panels A, B, and C, respectively. The sample in each panel includes all
students with non-missing grade 2 test scores and the respective outcome variable. In
column 1, we report estimates for specifications which include only the baseline school-,
class-, and student-level controls but no lagged test scores. 4th grade students in no-choice
states are estimated to outperform those in choice states by 0.14 standard deviations in
math, 0.07 standard deviations in reading, and 0.23 standard deviations in orthography.
Estimates for our preferred specification, which conditions on cubic functions for all
test scores and teacher ratings on students’ competences in grade 2,44 are reported in
column 2. As a result of the balancing documented in Table 5, these estimates are
very similar to those without test score controls in column 1 but have substantially
smaller standard errors. Our estimates suggest that binding track recommendations
raises grade 4 achievement by 0.14 standard deviations in math (p-value<0.001), 0.06
standard deviations in reading (p-value<0.1), and 0.21 standard deviations in orthogra-
phy (p-value<0.001). The result for reading is remarkably close to the estimate from
our preferred specification based on the DiD design reported in Table 4, while the math
coe cient is slightly larger than the DiD estimate. In column 3, we also report results
with grade 1 test score controls. Adding these controls reduces the sample size by around
10% but gives very similar results. We therefore view the specification in column 2 as
our preferred specification.
In Appendix B, we provide several further robustness checks for the results in Table
44Assessed competences include social skills, persistence and ability to concentrate, language, science,
and math. These subjective assessments were elicited by asking teachers to assess the skills and abilities of
a student in comparison to all other students of the same age on a 5-point scale ranging from “much worse”
to “much better”. We also control for teachers’ responses to the question: “From today’s perspective,
what school type would you recommend for this child?” in grade 2. Omitting controls for students’
assessed competences by their teacher leaves the coe cients in column 2 virtually unchanged. This
is further evidence for the assumption that students’ unobserved characteristics are uncorrelated with
track-choice policies conditional on our controls.
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6. These include a replication of the specification in column 1 with the same cohort of
students from the NAS data, re-estimation of the results dropping one state at a time,
inference based on standard errors clustered at the state level and wild cluster bootstrap
procedure, and specifications with more extensive (but potentially endogeneous) controls
for the schooling environment.
5.2.3 Di↵erence-in-di↵erence-in-di↵erences results
Finally, we present estimates based on the BG-DiD and DiDiD designs which exploit
within-cohort variation across grades and between pre- and post-repeal cohorts. As noted
in Section 3, an important caveat is that all of the following estimates are based on only
4-8 cell means. We therefore make no attempt at inference. To provide a fuller picture
of where di↵erences emerge, Figure 5 shows post-pre repeal di↵erences in the share of
students scoring at or above specific proficiency levels separately by proficiency levels,
grades, and repeal and no-repeal states. Panel A reveals no consist di↵erences in the
distribution of grade 3 math proficiency levels between pre- and post-repeal cohorts in
the repeal state (grey bars). For example, while the share of students scoring at or above
the 2nd lowest math level decreases from 2010 to 2015 by 5.35 percentage points, the
share at or above the 2nd highest level (level 4) increases by 5.4 percentage points. In
contrast, the grade 4 post-pre repeal di↵erences are consistently negative, ranging from
-10.10 percentage points (  level 4) to -6 percentage pints (  level 2 and   Level 5).
Panel B shows a similar pattern but with much smaller post-pre repeal di↵erences for
no-repeal states.
Figure 5, Panels C and D report analogous results for reading. Similar to the results
for math, Panel C shows that the share of students scoring at higher reading proficiency
levels in grade 4 decreases after the repeal of binding track assignment in the repeal
state. For no-repeal states (Panel D), there are no post-pre repeal di↵erences in grade 4.
It should be noted that Panel C also reveals large positive post-pre repeal di↵erences (up
to 16 percentage points) in grade 3 in the repeal state. However, as the same pattern can
be observed for the no-repeal states, this is most likely due to di↵erences in the definition
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of grade 3 proficiency levels across cohorts (i.e., lower-proficiency students being classified
into higher proficiency levels in the pre-repeal cohort), rather than genuine improvements
in post-repeal students’ reading proficiency in grade 3.
Figure 6 combines the results of Figure 5 by reporting BG-DiD and DiDiD results
based on equations (3) and (4), respectively. For math (Panel A), the BG-DiD results
(grey bars) indicate no change in the the share of students with the lowest math pro-
ficiency level in response to free track choice in the repeal state. However, the share
scoring at or above a specific higher proficiency level increases for all proficiency levels
above the second lowest level from grade 3 to grade 4 for the post-repeal cohort relative
to the pre-repeal cohort. Results for the DiDiD results (black bars), which are obtained
by taking the di↵erence of BG-DiD estimates between repeal and no-repeal states, yield
very similar results, ranging from -7.59 to -12.05 percentage points.
Figure 6, Panel B shows the corresponding BG-DiD and DiDiD results for reading. As
for math, both approaches indicate a relative decline in 4th graders’ reading proficiency
in response to free track choice. However, here the two approaches yield very di↵erent
e↵ect sizes. Estimates for the BG-DiD range from -4.9 to -21.60 percentage points, while
the DiDiD results are much smaller and exhibit less variation across proficiency levels,
ranging from -4.03 (  level 2) to -6.74 percentage points (  level 4). The larger BG-
DiD e↵ects are most likely due to a more generous proficiency level classification for the
post-repeal cohort in grade 3, as alluded to in our discussion of Figure 5. The resulting
increase in grade 3 proficiency levels for the post-repeal cohort inflates BG-DiD estimates.
The DiDiD design nets out this e↵ect, as post-repeal cohorts in no-repeal states exhibit
a similar increase in their grade 3 proficiency levels, which explains the smaller DiDiD
estimates.
In sum, the BG-DiD and DiDiD results provide further evidence for a decline in
students’ academic achievement in response to free track choice.45
45These results have to be interpreted in terms of changes in the share of students scoring at or above
specific proficiency levels. As such, they are not directly comparable to the DiD and lagged value-added
estimates, which measure average test score changes. However, to test the comparability of our results,
we checked that the DiDiD results deliver similar results as those based on a data generating process with
the following three features: (i) normally distributed student skills, (ii) shifts in the skill distribution
in response to free track choice corresponding to the DiD and lagged value-added estimates in Tables 4
26
5.3 E↵ects on well-being and intrinsic motivation
In order to fully assess the implications of high-stakes incentives, it is important to con-
sider other potential outcomes besides academic achievement. In particular, the richness
of the NEPS data permit us to explore two potential downsides of high-stakes incentives:
Their detrimental e↵ects on student well-being and intrinsic motivation. To this end, we
again use equation (2) using our preferred specification with full controls and di↵erent
measures of student well-being and a proxy for students’ intrinsic motivation as outcome
variables. The results are reported in Table 7. Each column refers to a di↵erent outcome,
which are all standardized to have mean zero and unit variance. Outcomes are mainly
available for grade 4, but when available for grade 3 or 5, we also report estimates for
these.
An important question is whether the increased pressure associated with high-stakes
incentives reduces student well-being. Performance settings that contain both uncon-
trollable and social-evaluative elements induce the largest increase in physiological stress
responses (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004), which are associated with worse mental health
and well-being outcomes in students (Shankar and Park, 2016). As a measure of subjec-
tive well-being, the NEPS survey includes the life satisfaction question: “How satisfied
are you overall with your life?”, which students answer on a 7-point scale ranging from
“completely unsatisfied” to “completely satisfied.” This is one of the most widely used
measures of subjective well-being (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010).46 Note that student
interviews in grade 4 and 5 took place between October and January of the respective
school year (see Table A.1). That is, we are measuring students’ well-being before they
know their track placement in grade 4 and after their transition to a secondary school
track in grade 5. Hence, survey responses in grade 4 should reflect the uncertainty and
pressure associated with having to qualify for a higher track in no-choice states rather
than di↵erences in eventual track placements.
and 6, and (iii) a skill-based classification of students into five proficiency levels matching the empirical
distributions in Figure 4.
46Despite some well-documented limitations of subjective well-being measures, there is ample evidence
that they contain significant information about the individual’s true well-being. Subjective well-being
is, for example, positively correlated to objective measures of well-being, such as emotional expressions
(Sandvik et al., 2009), and activity in the pleasure centers of the brain (Urry et al., 2004).
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As shown in the first column of Panel B, subjective well-being in grade 4, when
students should be most concerned about their track prospects, is 0.14 standard deviations
higher in choice states relative to no-choice states (p-value<0.001). This e↵ect persists
through grade 5, after students have entered a secondary school track (0.12 standard
deviations, p-value<0.05), indicative for a permanent reduction in student well-being in
no-choice states. The fact that we do not find any e↵ect in grade 3 (Panel A)—when
track placements are not yet salient—underscores a causal interpretation of the results.
Columns 2-4 in Panel B further indicate that the reduction in well-being in grade 4 is not
health related but, in line with an explanation based on academic stress, driven by school
performance anxiety and concerns about one’s future.47 Note that we find these negative
e↵ects for school performance anxiety despite the fact that students from no-choice states
have better test scores.
Research in psychology has debated for over three decades whether external incentives
inhibit students’ subsequent intrinsic motivation (see, e.g., Deci et al., 1999). We test
for potential crowding-out e↵ects in the last column of Table 7. Our measure of intrinsic
motivation is the first principal component of several student and parent questionnaire
items asking, for example how much students enjoy learning or whether they feel bored
at school.48 Mirroring the well-being results, we find no e↵ect of binding track recom-
mendations on intrinsic motivation in grade 3 (Panel A), which is a useful specification
check. By grade 4, however, intrinsic motivation is 0.13 standard deviations lower in
binding states (p-value<0.05, Panel B). It remains low and decreases even further by
grade 5 (Panel C) when students are not subject to tracking incentives anymore.
A caveat with the results for grade 5 is that they might reflect di↵erences in track
placements due to greater track choice in non-binding states. To address this concern,
we report in Table A.5 in the appendix results where we control for the mediating role of
47Satisfaction with health is measured on a 7-point scale by the question “How satisfied are you with
your health?” Anxiety about grades and students’ own future is measured on a 5-point scale by agreement
to the statements “In my last school week I was afraid of getting poor grades” and “In my last school
week I worried about my future.”
48The items and results for the principal-components analysis are reported in Table D.1 in the ap-
pendix.
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track placements by conditioning on the track that students attend in grade 5.49 These
estimates are very similar to those in Panel C of Table 7. The documented e↵ects in
grade 5 thus seem to capture the persistent reduction of student well-being and intrinsic
motivation due to the high-stakes incentives arising from binding track recommendations,
as opposed to di↵erences in track placements.
As far we know, ours is the first study to demonstrate the potentially harmful e↵ects
of high-stakes incentives on students’ subjective well-being and intrinsic motivation. This
contrasts with previous economic studies, which mostly find no evidence for crowding-out
e↵ects of external incentives in educational settings (see, e.g., Kremer et al., 2009; Fryer,
2011; Bettinger, 2012; Levitt et al., 2016; Barrow and Rouse, 2018).50 However, most of
these studies looked at relatively low-stakes incentives. One interpretation of this finding
is that only su ciently strong external incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation.
5.4 Discussion of potential mechanisms
The documented achievement e↵ects of binding track assignment could result from stu-
dent and/or parental responses. In this subsection, we try to assess their respective role in
driving the achievement e↵ects. We also discuss possible distortions of incentives through
teachers. Table 8 presents results using the same specification as in Table 6 with several
proxies for study e↵ort and parental behavior in grade 4 as outcome variables.51
As a proxy for students’ study e↵ort we use the reported time students spend on
doing homework and other school exercises outside the classroom. Column 1 shows that
students in states with binding track assignment spend 13 more minutes per day studying
outside the classroom (p-value<0.001)—a 25% di↵erence against the mean private study
time of 51 minutes per day. One explanation for the substantial increase in study e↵ort
49The validity of this mediation analysis depends on the assumption that track choice is independent
conditional on our controls. To further test the plausibility of this assumption, Table A.5 also reports
estimates where we additionally control for parents’ stated track preferences in grade 2, which gives very
similar results.
50The only study we could find that demonstrates crowding-out e↵ects is by Visaria et al. (2016).
They show that a scheme to reward school attendance in India lowered post-incentive school attendance,
test scores, and intrinsic motivation, but only among students with low baseline attendance.
51Except for the outcome in the first column (self-study), all outcomes have been standardized to
facilitate interpretation.
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could be that parents encourage their children to study more in no-choice states. The
NEPS includes several questions intended to measure this type of parental behavior, for
example, whether parents pay attention to how much time their child spends on home-
work. We performed a principal components analysis on all these items and generated
a parenting-style factor which loads positively on stricter rules and closer parental mon-
itoring.52 Column 2 shows the estimated e↵ect if we use the resulting parenting-style
factor as outcome variable. Contrary to what one would expect if the increase in study
e↵ort in no-choice states were explained by stricter rules and closer parental monitoring,
the estimated e↵ect is significantly positive. The most likely explanation for this finding
is that parents set stricter rules and monitor their children more closely in response to
students’ lower study e↵ort and achievement in choice states. This strongly suggests that
the increase in study e↵ort in no-choice states is driven by students themselves rather
than enforced by their parents.
Another explanation for the relative achievement gains in no-choice states could be
greater parental investments in the form of homework assistance or private tutoring. We
investigate this possibility in columns 3-5 with several measures of parental investments
as outcome variables. There is no evidence for di↵erences in parental investments across
choice and no-choice states; parents in no-choice states do not report to assist their
children with homework or other school exercises more often (columns 3-4), neither do
they invest more into private tutoring (column 5). The NAS data contain information
on private tutoring as well. Table A.6 presents results based on the DiD specification
with private tutoring in grade 4 as the dependent variable. Again, contrary to what one
would expect if the achievement gains due to tracking incentives were driven by greater
parental investments, repealing binding track assignment appears to decrease private
tutoring. This is further evidence that parents respond to lower student e↵ort under free
track choice by investing more into private tutoring.
Furthermore, we can test whether teachers adjust the strictness of their track rec-
ommendations depending on whether they are binding or not. For example, teachers
52See Tables D.2 and D.3 for the questionnaire items and the results of the principal-components
analysis. We use the first principal component as outcome variable in Table 8.
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could be more lenient when a student’s further academic career directly depends on their
assessment. This would imply that teachers attenuate the incentive e↵ect of binding
recommendations. We test this with the NAS data using the DiD approach. Table A.4,
column 4 shows that teachers make fewer academic track recommendations when they
are non-binding, consistent with lower student achievement in the absence of high-stakes
incentives. However, once test score controls are included to account for the fact that
student achievement declines with free track choice, column 5 shows that this e↵ect dis-
appears. This suggests that teachers equally reward performance under both conditions
and do not weaken students’ and parents’ investment incentives arising from binding
track recommendations.53
Taken together, the results in this section suggest that the documented achievement
gains due to a binding track assignment policy are driven by students’ e↵ort responses
to high-stakes incentives.
5.5 Allowing for heterogeneous e↵ects
In this section, we explore whether students di↵er in their response to high-stakes incen-
tives by interacting the free-track-choice indicator with several student characteristics.
The coe cients for these interaction terms are reported in Table 9. All regressions in
Table 9 are based on the lagged valued-added model and include the same controls as
those of our preferred specification from column 2 in Table 6.
Several studies have found that girls respond stronger to incentives in educational
settings (see, e.g. Angrist et al., 2009; Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Kremer et al., 2009; Bet-
tinger, 2012; Hvidman and Sievertsen, 2019) and are more patient than boys (Sutter et al.,
2019), so should in particular respond more strongly to delayed rewards. The results in
Panel A confirm this: Girls spend 15 more minutes per day studying on their own in no-
choice relative to choice states. For boys the e↵ort response is with 10 minutes somewhat
smaller. These gender di↵erences in study-e↵ort responses are also reflected in achieve-
53Additionally, Table B.3 in the appendix shows that teacher behavior does not explain any achieve-
ment e↵ects of tracking incentives as the results are unchanged when controlling for classroom activities,
teaching styles, teacher school involvement etc.
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ment di↵erences, which are always larger for girls than for boys. In fact, boys’ reading
achievement appears to be una↵ected by track-assignment policies, while girls score 0.13
standard deviations higher on the reading test in no-choice states (p-value<0.001). In
math and orthography, boys from no-choice states also outperform those from choice
states, but less so than girls.
Next, we investigate distributional e↵ects. Panel B displays results by quartiles of
the distribution of average test scores in grade 2. The point estimates suggest that
students across the entire achievement distribution spend more time studying when track
assignment is binding and see their test scores increase as a result. However, estimated
test score e↵ects are always largest for students from the bottom quartile. Hence, binding
track assignment seems not only to shift the entire achievement distribution but also to
disproportionately benefit low-performing students.
If parental behavior was the main explanation for the observed test score di↵erences
between choice and no-choice states, we would expect larger e↵ects for parents with more
resources (academic knowledge, time, and money) to invest in their children. To check
this, we estimate e↵ects separately by educational background in Panel C. Overall, we find
very similar e↵ects across family backgrounds. Only for students from parents without an
academic school degree do we not find a significant e↵ect for reading. All other estimated
e↵ects are similar to the average e↵ects reported in Table 6 and statistically significant.
This pattern is consistent with the lack of evidence for parental responses in Table 8 and
corroborates the idea that our estimated e↵ects are driven by student responses rather
than parental behavior.
Table A.7 in the appendix reports heterogeneous e↵ects by gender and parental educa-
tion for the NAS data based on the DiD design. The results are qualitatively very similar
to those in Table 9. Repealing binding track assignment has a somewhat stronger e↵ect
on girls for all tests. Results by parental education are also roughly similar, which again
speaks against parental behavior as an explanation for the strong student responses.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study responses to high-stakes incentives in primary school arising from
track assignment policies in a rigorous early ability tracking system. Across three research
designs and data sets we find free secondary school track choice, as opposed to binding
track assignment, to decrease students’ study e↵ort and academic achievement at the end
of primary school. These e↵ects can be found throughout the achievement distribution.
However, low-achieving students show the strongest responses, both in terms of study
e↵ort and acquired skills, suggesting that ability tracking incentives potentially decrease
educational inequalities in primary school.
Yet we also identify an important trade-o↵ with regard to high-stakes incentives. The
achievement gains due to higher pressure to perform are associated with a reduction in
students’ well-being and intrinsic motivation to study.
Importantly, we find no evidence that parental behavior drives students’ responses
to tracking incentives. Plausible hypotheses about parental responses to tracking incen-
tives, such as more homework assistance, stricter study rules and closer monitoring, or
private tutoring, all seem to contradict our rich survey data in important ways. Our ef-
fects are therefore best accommodated by an explanation where ability tracking directly
incentivizes primary school students to exert more e↵ort.
Our results might at first sight appear to contradict a large body of research document-
ing negative e↵ects of early tracking on achievement and educational equity. However,
most of these studies are somewhat limited in their ability to identify the e↵ort inducing
e↵ects of tracking that we find in this study. This is for two reasons. First, many studies
identify tracking e↵ects by comparing test score gains from lower grade (before track-
ing) to higher grade (after tracking) between tracking and no-tracking systems, thereby
absorbing any pre-tracking gains (see, e.g. Hanushek and Wössmann, 2006; Ruhose and
Schwerdt, 2016; Matthewes, 2020).54 Second, much of the remaining evidence comes
from studies looking at the long-run e↵ects of postponing the age of tracking (Meghir
54This drawback of the test score gain design has been pointed out before (see, e.g., Hanushek and
Wössmann, 2006; Manning and Pischke, 2006; Waldinger, 2007).
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and Palme, 2005; Aakvik et al., 2010; Pekkala Kerr et al., 2013; Borghans et al., 2020;
Canaan, 2020). Students are still tracked at some point during secondary school in these
contexts. As such, these estimates tell us little about the e↵ects of tracking incentives.
This is not to say that our results imply that tracking has positive net e↵ects. To the
contrary, to the extent that we find positive e↵ects at the end of primary school, previous
estimates of the long-run e↵ects of tracking most likely underestimate the harmful e↵ect
of students’ experiences in tracked secondary schools.
While Germany’s rigorous ability tracking system is unique in that it tracks students
as young as age 10, our findings have broad implications since many school systems
feature similar high-stakes settings which create immediate incentives for primary and
secondary students. Examples include grade retention policies, admission procedures for
selective primary and middle schools, or merit scholarships. Our findings suggest that
these features play an important role in the acquisition of human capital by inducing
greater study e↵ort in young students who are otherwise unlikely to be aware of the long-
run returns to their present educational investments (Oreopoulos, 2007; Gneezy et al.,
2011). More broadly, our study demonstrates that high-stakes incentives, even those with
some delay in rewards, motivate children to invest learning e↵ort, and that this e↵ort,
indeed, improves their academic performance.
This suggests that policy levers to raise e↵ort through the use of incentives are worth
considering seriously. Policy-makers should, however, also consider that while raising
educational attainment is associated with large positive e↵ects, e.g. on later employment,
earnings (Heckman, 2006), and health (Grossman, 2006), they might come at a cost to
student well-being in the short run.
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Figure 1: Schematic overview of the tracking system in Germany
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Grade




Notes: Figure adapted from Matthewes (2020). Academic track = Gymnasium, Intermediate
track = Realschule, Basic track = Hauptschule.
41










































Notes: Panel A shows the fraction of grade 3 student answers to the question: “What do you
think, how good would your prospects of getting a good job be with the following school-leaving
qualification?” Panel B shows the fraction of grade 4 student answers to the question:“Now
matter how good you are in school: Which school degree would you like to have?” Source: NEPS
Wave 5 and 6.
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Notes: The graph plots transition rates for the basic and academic track over time. Transition
rates for a particular year are calculated as the share of students entering a specific track in grade
5 in that year. Since tracking occurs in grade 7 in Berlin and Brandenburg, transition rates for
these two states are calculated as the share of students entering a specific track in grade 7 in year
t+2. The group of repeal states consists of Baden-Württemberg and Saxony-Anhalt. No-repeal
states are Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bremen, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate,
Bavaria, Saarland, Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, and Thuringia.
Own illustration based on data from the German Federal Statistical O ce: Allgemeinbildende
Schulen Fachserie 11, Reihe 1: https://www.destatis.de/GPStatistik/receive/DESerie_
serie_00000110. (Retrieved: 11/5/2020)
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Notes: The graph shows the fraction of students by proficiency levels aggregated over the four
states Schleswig-Holstein, Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, and Brandenburg for the school cohorts
who are in grade 4 in the school years 2010/2011 and 2015/2016. See Table A.2 for details on
the data sources.
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≥/HYHO ≥/HYHO ≥/HYHO /HYHO
3DQHO'5HDGLQJQRUHSHDOVWDWHV
*UDGH *UDGH
Notes: The graph shows changes in the share of students at or above a proficiency level between
post- and pre-repeal cohorts by proficiency levels for grade-levels 3 (grey) and 4 (black). Pre-
and post-repeal cohorts refer to school cohorts in grade 4 in the school years 2010/2011 and
2015/2016, respectively. Panel A and C show changes for the repeal state (Baden-Württemberg)
for math and reading, respectively. Panel B and D show changes for the no-repeal states
(Schleswig-Holstein, Berlin, and Brandenburg) for math and reading, respectively. See Table
A.2 for details on the data sources.
45
Figure 6: Estimated e↵ects on the the share of students scoring at or above specific

















































≥/HYHO ≥/HYHO ≥/HYHO /HYHO
3DQHO%5HDGLQJ
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Notes: The graph shows BG-DiD (grey) and DiDiD (black) estimates of the e↵ect of free track
choice on the share of students scoring at or above a proficiency level in math (Panel A) and
reading (Panel B) based on equations (3) and (4), respectively. See Table A.2 for details on the
data sources.
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Table 1: Binding school track assignment at the end of primary school





North Rhine-Westphalia (NW) X
Hesse (HE)
Rhineland-Palatinate (RP)
Baden-Württemberg (BW) X X
Bavaria (BY) X X X X X X X
Saarland (SL)
Berlin (BE)
Brandenburg (BB) X X X X X X X
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (MV)
Saxony (SN) X X X X X X X
Saxony-Anhalt (ST) X X
Thuringia (TH) X X X X X X X
Notes: The checkmark (X) indicates that the school’s recommendation for a secondary school track was
binding in the respective school year. Source: State-specific school laws and www.kmk.org.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: NAS
Mean SD N
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Student characteristics
Repeal state 0.11 0.32 48,080
Male 0.47 0.50 48,080
Age at test in grade 4 10.43 0.49 48,047
Years in public childcare 3.64 0.77 37,438
Grade repeater 0.08 0.27 48,080
Grade skipper 0.01 0.11 48,080
Any learning disability 0.08 0.27 47,944
Mother’s years of education 14.45 2.26 27,653
Fathers’s years of education 14.83 2.66 25,393
Parents’ highest ISEI 51.53 18.44 35,298
Books at home (in 5 categories) 3.43 1.19 43,700
Mothers’s employment status
Full-time employed 0.30 0.46 35,666
Part-time employed 0.49 0.50 35,666
Not employed 0.07 0.25 35,666
Other employment status 0.15 0.26 35,666
Father’s employment status
Full-time employed 0.86 0.35 33,275
Part-time employed 0.04 0.20 33,275
Not employed 0.02 0.15 33,275
Other employment status 0.07 0.26 33,275
Migration background 0.26 0.44 44,804
Non-native German speaker 0.18 0.39 45,078
Born in Germany 0.96 0.20 44,047
Panel B: School characteristics
Private school 0.05 0.21 45,078
Municipality size (in 6 categories) 3.64 1.84 44,412
Total enrolment 273.19 149.31 44,684
Full-day status
No full-day 0.55 0.50 48,080
Binding full-day 0.07 0.25 48,080
Partly binding full-day 0.06 0.23 48,080
Open binding full-day 0.33 0.47 48,080
Panel C: Class characteristics
Weekly instruction hours in German 5.14 0.86 44,170
Weekly instruction hours in Math 6.03 0.46 44,397
Math teacher’s working experience (in years) 21.23 12.42 40,157
German teacher’s working experience (in years) 20.27 12.27 41,206
Share special-needs students 0.04 0.06 47,782
Notes: The sample consists of all students without special-needs status
with at least one non-missing test score. Means and standard deviations are
conditional on non-missing survey responses. Source: National Assessment
Study.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics: NEPS
Mean SD N
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Student characteristics
Track choice state 0.751 0.431 4,915
Male 0.480 0.500 4,915
Age at test in grade 4 9.747 0.379 4,915
Early school enrolment 0.048 0.214 4,197
Late school enrolment 0.052 0.221 4,197
Grade repeater 0.014 0.116 4,518
Premature birth 0.087 0.281 4,915
Any learning disability 0.165 0.371 4,915
Dyslexia 0.064 0.245 4,518
Dyscalculia 0.017 0.130 4,518
Mother’s years of education 14.278 2.364 4,395
Fathers’s years of education 14.329 2.435 3,967
Mother’s ISEI 52.496 19.423 4,306
Father’s ISEI 52.838 21.980 3,864
Books at home (in 6 categories) 4.158 1.264 4,403
Number of siblings 1.370 1.047 4,026
Migration background
1. Generation migrant 0.021 0.144 4,516
2. Generation migrant 0.196 0.397 4,516
3. Generation migrant 0.113 0.317 4,516
Parents’ marital status
Married 0.825 0.380 4,517
Married but living apart 0.033 0.178 4,517
Divorced 0.048 0.215 4,517
Widowed 0.004 0.066 4,517
Single 0.087 0.282 4,517
Registered civil partnership 0.002 0.049 4,517
Panel B: School characteristics
Private school 0.047 0.211 3,901
Total enrolment 278.684 139.342 4,290
Schools within 10km radius 8.081 8.429 4,155
Student-teacher ratio 0.071 0.022 4,182
Share teaching sta↵ under 35 years 0.195 0.140 4,121
Share teaching sta↵ 35 to under 45 years 0.278 0.150 4,136
Share teaching sta↵ 45 to under 55 years 0.271 0.153 4,113
Share teaching sta↵ 55 to under 65 years 0.280 0.174 4,083
Share teaching sta↵ 65 years and older 0.007 0.043 3,474
Share special-needs students 0.029 0.033 4,100
Share low SES students 0.247 0.172 3,607
Share high SES students 0.202 0.142 3,566
Share migrant students 0.241 0.215 4,125
Panel C: Class characteristics
Class size 21.875 3.527 4,629
Weekly instruction hours in German 5.923 0.790 3,389
Weekly instruction hours in Math 5.092 0.448 3,391
Two teaching sta↵ per class 25% of the teaching time 0.363 0.481 4,670
Two teaching sta↵ per class 50% of the teaching time 0.084 0.277 4,670
Two teaching sta↵ per class 75% of the teaching time 0.031 0.173 4,670
Two teaching sta↵ per class 100% of the teaching time 0.010 0.098 4,670
Notes: The sample consists of all students with non-missing grade 2 test scores
and at least one non-missing grade 4 test score. Means and standard deviations are
conditional on non-missing survey responses. Source: German National Educational
Panel Study Starting Cohort 2.
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Table 4: Estimated e↵ects on 4th grade test scores: di↵erence-in-
di↵erences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Math
Track choice -0.166*** -0.113*** -0.103*** -0.105***
(0.048) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
N 47,039 47,039 47,039 47,039
Adj. R2 0.044 0.135 0.136 0.289
Panel B: Reading
Track choice -0.122*** -0.078** -0.072** -0.071**
(0.044) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
N 46,075 46,075 46,075 46,075
Adj. R2 0.022 0.092 0.092 0.211
Panel C: Listening
Track choice -0.142*** -0.102*** -0.099*** -0.099***
(0.046) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
N 45,500 45,500 45,500 45,500
Adj. R2 0.012 0.106 0.107 0.204
State & year FE X X X X
School composition controls X X X
School input controls X X
Student-level controls X
Notes: Each cell of the table reports results from a separate regression of
the respective test score on an indicator for free track choice. All regressions
include state, year, and test booklet fixed e↵ects. School compositions con-
trols include a categorical variable for the size of the municipality in which
the school is located (in 6 categories); class-level averages of parents’ years
of education, highest ISEI, books at home; percent of students in class with
a any learning disability, special-needs status, migration background, male,
non-native German speakers, grade repeater. School input controls include
school enrolment, a private school indicator, controls for the type of full-day
o↵er in 4 categories (no full-day program, binding full-day, partly binding
full-day, open full-day program), grade 4 instruction hours in math and Ger-
man; years of experience of the German and math teacher. Student-level
controls include indicators for any learning disability, special-needs status,
migration background, male, non-native German speakers, grade repeater;
years spent in public childcare, linear and quadratic age at test; mother’s
and father’s highest years of education, highest ISES, country of birth in
5 categories (Germany, Poland, Russia, Turkey, other), work status in 4
categories (full-time, part-time, not employed, other), EGP class in 11 cate-
gories. Standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering at the school level.
Significance level: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Specification check: lagged value-added
Grade 1 Grade 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Average composite score
Track choice -0.200*** 0.006 -0.122*** -0.015 -0.002
(0.0441) (0.040) (0.031) (0.037) (0.030)
N 5,966 5,966 5,139 5,139 5,139
Adj. R2 0.010 0.345 0.005 0.223 0.496
Panel B: Math
Track choice -0.155*** 0.045 -0.158*** -0.008 0.002
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.047) (0.039)
N 6,210 6,210 5,333 5,333 5,333
Adj. R2 0.004 0.238 0.005 0.233 0.543
Panel C: Language (vocabulary and grammar)
Track choice -0.251*** -0.014
(0.053) (0.052)
N 6,203 6,203
Adj. R2 0.014 0.350
Panel D: Reading
Track choice -0.134*** -0.054 -0.034
(0.047) (0.051) (0.048)
N 5,283 5,283 5,283
adj. R2 0.003 0.170 0.280
Panel E: Science
Track choice -0.183*** 0.015
(0.050) (0.046)
N 6,221 6,221
Adj. R2 0.006 0.249
Panel F: Cognition (non-verbal)
Track choice -0.062 0.017 0.027
(0.038) (0.049) (0.045)
N 5,275 5,275 5,275
Adj. R2 0.001 0.097 0.194
School & class controls X X X
Student controls X X X
Grade 1 test score controls X
Notes: Each cell of the table reports results from a separate regression of the
respective test score on an indicator for free track choice. School and class controls
include community size (in 7 categories), settlement structure (in 11 categories),
school enrolment, number of schools within 10 km radius, a private school indicator,
number of teachers at school, share of full-time teachers at school, share of teachers
at the school in each of the following age categories: below 35, between 35 and
below 45, between 45 and 55, between 55 and below 65, and 65 or older; class size,
grade 2-3 instruction hours in math and German; the first principal component of
the class teacher’s qualifications grades, indicators for whether lessons are taught by
more than one teacher, whether there is additional socio-educational sta↵ or special
educational needs sta↵ for the class; the class level share of low SES students, high
SES students, special needs students, and students with migration background.
Student controls include sex, indicators for early or late schol enrolment, premature
birth, Dyslexia, migration background, grade repetition, mother and father’s years
of education and ISEI, reported books at home, number of siblings, and marital
status (in 5 categories). Grade 1 test score controls include cubic functions of
math, language, and, science test scores. Standard errors in parentheses allow for
clustering at the school level. Significance level: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05 ; ***
p < 0.01.
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Track choice -0.138*** -0.136*** -0.140***
(0.043) (0.031) (0.034)
N 4,800 4,800 4,379
Adj. R2 0.202 0.515 0.542
Panel B: Reading
Track choice -0.066 -0.062* -0.071**
(0.042) (0.034) (0.035)
N 4,798 4,798 4,378
Adj. R2 0.195 0.429 0.475
Panel C: Orthography
Track choice -0.211*** -0.205*** -0.199***
(0.044) (0.037) (0.038)
N 4,533 4,533 4,130
Adj. R2 0.242 0.567 0.565
School & class controls X X X
Individual controls X X X
Grade 2 test score controls X X
Grade 1 test score controls X
Notes: Each cell of the table reports results from a separate
regression of the respective test score on an indicator for free
track choice. School and class controls include community size
(in 7 categories), settlement structure (in 11 categories), school
enrolment, number of schools within 10 km radius, a private
school indicator, number of teachers at school, share of full-
time teachers at school, share of teachers at the school in each
of the following age categories: below 35, between 35 and be-
low 45, between 45 and 55, between 55 and below 65, and 65
or older; class size, grade 2-3 instruction hours in math and
German; the first principal component of the class teacher’s
qualifications grades, indicators for whether lessons are taught
by more than one teacher, whether there is additional socio-
educational or special educational needs sta↵ in the class; the
class level share of low SES students, high SES students, special
needs students, and students with migration background. Stu-
dent controls include sex, indicators for early or late schol enrol-
ment, premature birth, Dyslexia, migration background, grade
repetition, mother and father’s years of education and ISEI, re-
ported books at home, number of siblings, and marital status
(in 5 categories). Grade 2 test score controls include cubic func-
tions of math, reading, and cognition test scores, and teacher
assessments of students’ social skills, persistence and ability to
concentrate, language skills in German, written language skills,
science knowledge, and mathematical skills (each measured in 5
categories). Grade 1 test score controls include cubic functions
of math, language, and, science test scores. Standard errors in
parentheses allow for clustering at the school level. Significance
level: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Estimated e↵ects on well-being and intrinsic motivation: lagged value-
added
Satisfaction w/ Anxiety about
life health grades own future Intrinsic motivation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Grade 3
Track choice -0.029 -0.003 0.008
(0.044) (0.042) (0.056)
N 4,724 4,716 3,237
Adj. R2 0.013 0.018 0.117
Panel B: Grade 4
Track choice 0.146*** 0.033 -0.114** -0.166*** 0.129**
(0.044) (0.042) (0.048) (0.045) (0.063)
N 4,698 4,707 3,116 4,663 4,663
Adj. R2 0.017 0.020 0.129 0.127 0.022
Panel C: Grade 5
Track choice 0.114** 0.049 0.133**
(0.051) (0.051) (0.059)
N 2,955 2,976 2,291
Adj. R2 0.023 0.010 0.086
School & class controls X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X
Grade 2 test score controls X X X X X
Notes: Each cell of the table reports results from a separate regression of the variable in
the column header on an indicator for free track choice. School and class controls include
community size (in 7 categories), settlement structure (in 11 categories), school enrolment,
number of schools within 10 km radius, a private school indicator, number of teachers at school,
share of full-time teachers at school, share of teachers at the school in each of the following
age categories: below 35, between 35 and below 45, between 45 and 55, between 55 and below
65, and 65 or older; class size, grade 2-3 instruction hours in math and German; the first
principal component of the class teacher’s qualifications grades, indicators for whether lessons
are taught by more than one teacher, whether there is additional socio-educational or special
educational needs sta↵ in the class; ; the class level share of low SES students, high SES students,
special needs students, and students with migration background. Student controls include sex,
indicators for early or late schol enrolment, premature birth, Dyslexia, migration background,
grade repetition, mother and father’s years of education and ISEI, reported books at home,
number of siblings, and marital status (in 5 categories). Grade 2 test score controls include
cubic functions of math, reading, and cognition test scores, and teacher assessments of students’
social skills, persistence and ability to concentrate, language skills in German, written language
skills, science knowledge, and mathematical skills (each measured in 5 categories). Significance
level: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Estimated e↵ects on self-study and parental behavior: lagged valued-added
Frequency of parental help w/
Daily self-study (in min) Stricter parenting style homework other school exercises Private tutoring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Track choice -12.773*** 0.139*** 0.043 -0.036 0.004
(1.664) (0.048) (0.052) (0.045) (0.011)
School & class controls X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X
Grade 2 test score controls X X X X X
Mean dependent variable 50.785
N 3,459 4,089 3,256 2,162 3,475
Adj. R2 0.214 0.054 0.122 0.118 0.119
Notes: Each cell of the table reports results from a separate regression of the respective variable in the column header on an indicator
for free track choice. School and class controls include community size (in 7 categories), settlement structure (in 11 categories), school
enrolment, number of schools within 10 km radius, a private school indicator, number of teachers at school, share of full-time teachers
at school, share of teachers at the school in each of the following age categories: below 35, between 35 and below 45, between 45 and 55,
between 55 and below 65, and 65 or older; class size, grade 2-3 instruction hours in math and German; the first principal component of
the class teacher’s qualifications grades, indicators for whether lessons are taught by more than one teacher, whether there is additional
socio-educational or special educational needs sta↵ in the class; ; the class level share of low SES students, high SES students, special
needs students, and students with migration background. Student controls include sex, indicators for early or late schol enrolment,
premature birth, Dyslexia, migration background, grade repetition, mother and father’s years of education and ISEI, reported books at
home, number of siblings, and marital status (in 5 categories). Grade 2 test score controls include cubic functions of math, reading, and
cognition test scores, and teacher assessments of students’ social skills, persistence and ability to concentrate, language skills in German,
written language skills, science knowledge, and mathematical skills (each measured in 5 categories). Significance level: * p < 0.10; **
p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 9: E↵ect heterogeneity: lagged valued-added
4th grade test scores
Daily self-study (in min) Math Reading Orthography
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: By gender
Track choice * female -14.887*** -0.170*** -0.122*** -0.211***
(2.074) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042)
Track choice * male -10.469*** -0.101*** 0.000 -0.200***
(1.939) (0.036) (0.043) (0.043)
N 3,459 4,800 4,798 4,533
Adj. R2 0.215 0.515 0.430 0.567
Panel B: By lagged grade 2 test scores
Track choice * bottom quartile lagged test scores -18.359*** -0.148** -0.108* -0.305***
(3.241) (0.058) (0.058) (0.055)
Track choice * second quartile lagged test scores -11.890*** -0.137** -0.075 -0.142***
(2.576) (0.054) (0.057) (0.052)
Track choice * third quartile lagged test scores -14.503*** -0.130*** -0.083 -0.166***
(2.732) (0.048) (0.053) (0.049)
Track choice * top quartile lagged test scores -8.966*** -0.132*** 0.001 -0.245***
(2.125) (0.044) (0.051) (0.054)
N 3,459 4,800 4,798 4,533
Adj. R2 0.215 0.514 0.429 0.568
Panel C: By highest school degree of parents
Track choice * academic degree -12.735*** -0.145*** -0.089** -0.192***
(1.767) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039)
Track choice * less than academic degree -12.858*** -0.123*** -0.022 -0.227***
(2.089) (0.038) (0.041) (0.044)
N 3,459 4,800 4,798 4,533
Adj. R2 0.213 0.515 0.430 0.567
School & class controls X X X X
Individual controls X X X X
Grade 2 test score controls X X X X
Notes: Each column within a panel reports results from a separate regression of the outcome in the column
header on the variables in the leftmost column. School and class controls include community size (in 7
categories), settlement structure (in 11 categories), school enrolment, number of schools within 10 km radius,
a private school indicator, number of teachers at school, share of full-time teachers at school, share of teachers
at the school in each of the following age categories: below 35, between 35 and below 45, between 45 and 55,
between 55 and below 65, and 65 or older; class size, grade 2-3 instruction hours in math and German; the
first principal component of the class teacher’s qualifications grades, indicators for whether lessons are taught
by more than one teacher, whether there is additional socio-educational or special educational needs sta↵ in
the class; ; the class level share of low SES students, high SES students, special needs students, and students
with migration background. Student controls include sex, indicators for early or late school enrolment,
premature birth, Dyslexia, migration background, grade repetition, mother and father’s years of education
and ISEI, reported books at home, number of siblings, and marital status (in 5 categories). Grade 2 test
score controls include cubic functions of math, reading, and cognition test scores, and teacher assessments
of students’ social skills, persistence and ability to concentrate, language skills in German, written language
skills, science knowledge, and mathematical skills (each measured in 5 categories).
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Table A.1: Structure of NEPS data
Month 10 11 12 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Wave 3: Grade 1
Year 2012 2013
Tests & student survey
Parent survey
Teacher survey
Wave 4: Grade 2
Year 2013 2014
Tests & student survey
Parent survey
Teacher survey
Wave 5: Grade 3
Year 2014 2015
Tests & student survey
Parent survey
Teacher survey
Wave 6: Grade 4
Year 2015 2016
Tests & student survey
Parent survey
Teacher survey




Notes: They grey cells indicate the months during which





Table A.2: State-level data sources
Data Year Source
Vera 3 (proficiency levels in grade 3)
Schleswig-Holstein 2010 IQSH




Baden Württemberg 2010 LS BW
www.ls-bw.de
(last accessed 10.10.2020)
Baden Württemberg 2015 LS BW
www.ls-bw.de
(last accessed 10.10.2020)
Berlin & Brandenburg 2010 ISQ-BB
www.isq-bb.de
(last accessed 10.10.2020)
Berlin & Brandenburg 2015 ISQ-BB
www.isq-bb.de
(last accessed 10.10.2020)
IQB (proficiency levels in grade 4)
Schleswig-Holstein, Baden Württemberg,
Berlin & Brandenburg 2011 IQB Berlin
www.iqb.hu-berlin.de/
(last accessed 05.4.2020)
Schleswig-Holstein, Baden Württemberg, 2016 IQB Berlin
Berlin & Brandenburg www.iqb.hu-berlin.de/
(last accessed 05.4.2020)
This table shows the data source for the state-level analyses which are published online.
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Table A.3: School year starting dates by year
State 2012 2013 2015
Schleswig-Holstein Aug. 04 Aug. 03 Aug. 29.
Hamburg Aug. 01. Jul. 31 Aug. 26.
Lower Saxony Aug. 31. Aug. 07 Sep. 02.
Bremen Aug. 31. Aug. 07 Sep. 02.
North Rhine-Westphalia Aug. 31. Sep. 03 Aug. 11.
Hesse Aug. 10. Aug. 16 Sep. 04.
Rhineland-Palatinate Aug. 10. Aug. 16 Sep. 04.
Baden-Württemberg Sep. 08. Sep. 07 Sep. 12.
Bavaria Sep. 12. Sep. 11 Sep. 14.
Saarland Aug. 14. Aug. 16 Sep. 05.
Berlin Aug. 13. Aug. 02 Aug. 28.
Brandenburg Aug. 03. Aug. 03 Aug. 28.
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Aug. 04. Aug. 03 Aug. 29.
Saxony Aug. 31. Aug. 28 Aug. 21.
Saxony-Anhalt Sep. 05. Aug. 28 Aug. 26.




Table A.4: Estimated e↵ects on academic track recommen-
dation: di↵erence-in-di↵erences
Academic track recommendation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Track choice -0.054** -0.031* -0.034* -0.035** -0.010
(0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
State & year FE X X X X X
School composition controls X X X X
School input controls X X X
Student-level controls X X
Test score controls X
N 37,188 37,188 37,188 37,188 36,033
Adj. R2 0.012 0.068 0.069 0.233 0.394
Notes: Each cell of the table reports results from a separate regres-
sion of an indicator for a recommendation for the academic track
on an indicator for free track choice. All regressions include state,
year, and test booklet fixed e↵ects. School compositions controls in-
clude a categorical variable for the size of the municipality in which
the school is located (in 6 categories); class-level averages of par-
ents’ years of education, highest ISEI, books at home; percent of
students in class with a any learning disability, special-needs status,
migration background, male, non-native German speakers, grade re-
peater. School input controls include school enrolment, a private
school indicator, controls for the type of full-day o↵er in 4 categories
(no full-day program, binding full-day, partly binding full-day, open
full-day program), grade 4 instruction hours in math and German;
years of experience of the German and math teacher. Student-level
controls include indicators for any learning disability, special-needs
status, migration background, male, non-native German speakers,
grade repeater; years spent in public childcare, linear and quadratic
age at test; mother’s and father’s highest years of education, highest
ISES, country of birth in 5 categories (Germany, Poland, Russia,
Turkey, other), work status in 4 categories (full-time, part-time, not
employed, other), EGP class in 11 categories. Test score controls
include test scores in math, reading, and listening. Standard errors
in parentheses allow for clustering at the school level. Significance
level: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Robustness check of estimated e↵ects on well-being and intrinsic
motivation in grade 5: lagged value-added
Satisfaction w/
life health Intrinsic motivation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Track choice 0.114** 0.105* 0.049 0.026 0.133** 0.135**
(0.051) (0.057) (0.051) (0.060) (0.059) (0.062)
School & class controls X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X X
Grade 2 test score controls X X X X X X
School track controls X X X
Parental track preference controls X X X
N 2,955 2,674 2,976 2,691 2,291 2,186
Adj. R2 0.023 0.013 0.010 0.003 0.086 0.094
Notes: Each cell of the table reports results from a separate regression of the respec-
tive test score on an indicator for free track choice. School and class controls include
community size (in 7 categories), settlement structure (in 11 categories), school en-
rolment, number of schools within 10 km radius, a private school indicator, number of
teachers at school, share of full-time teachers at school, share of teachers at the school
in each of the following age categories: below 35, between 35 and below 45, between
45 and 55, between 55 and below 65, and 65 or older; class size, grade 2-3 instruc-
tion hours in math and German; the first principal component of the class teacher’s
qualifications grades, indicators for whether lessons are taught by more than one
teacher, whether there is additional socio-educational or special educational needs
sta↵ in the class; the class level share of low SES students, high SES students, special
needs students, and students with migration background. Student controls include
sex, indicators for early or late schol enrolment, premature birth, Dyslexia, migra-
tion background, grade repetition, mother and father’s years of education and ISEI,
reported books at home, number of siblings, and marital status (in 5 categories).
Grade 2 test score controls include cubic functions of math, reading, and cognition
test scores, and teacher assessments of students’ social skills, persistence and ability
to concentrate, language skills in German, written language skills, science knowledge,
and mathematical skills (each measured in 5 categories). School track controls include
separate indicators the attended secondary school track. Parental track preference
controls include a control for the stated track preference of the parents in grade 2.
Significance level: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Estimated e↵ects on private tutoring:
di↵erence-in-di↵erences
Private tutoring in grade 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Track choice 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.028***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
State & year FE X X X X
School composition controls X X X
School input controls X X
Student level controls X
N 36,054 36,054 36,054 36,054
adj. R2 0.024 0.035 0.036 0.099
Notes: Each column within a panel reports results from a sepa-
rate regression of an indicator for private tutoring on an indica-
tor for free track choice. All regressions include state, year, and
test booklet fixed e↵ects. School compositions controls include
a categorical variable for the size of the municipality in which
the school is located (in 6 categories); class-level averages of par-
ents’ years of education, highest ISEI, books at home; percent of
students in class with a any learning disability, special-needs sta-
tus, migration background, male, non-native German speakers,
grade repeater. School input controls include school enrolment,
a private school indicator, controls for the type of full-day o↵er in
4 categories (no full-day program, binding full-day, partly bind-
ing full-day, open full-day program), grade 4 instruction hours
in math and German; years of experience of the German and
math teacher. Student-level controls include indicators for any
learning disability, special-needs status, migration background,
male, non-native German speakers, grade repeater; years spent
in public childcare, linear and quadratic age at test; mother’s
and father’s highest years of education, highest ISES, country of
birth in 5 categories (Germany, Poland, Russia, Turkey, other),
work status in 4 categories (full-time, part-time, not employed,
other), EGP class in 11 categories.
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Table A.7: E↵ect heterogeneity: di↵erence-in-di↵erences
4th grade test scores
Math Reading Listening
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: By gender
Track choice * female -0.114*** -0.076** -0.101***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
Track choice * male -0.106*** -0.072* -0.092**
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
N 47,039 46,075 45,500
adj. R2 0.282 0.205 0.201
Panel B: By highest school degree of parents
Track choice * academic degree -0.069 -0.062 -0.105**
(0.045) (0.044) (0.047)
Track choice * less than academic degree -0.074* -0.061 -0.102**
(0.042) (0.041) (0.044)
N 27,084 26,723 26,280
adj. R2 0.274 0.190 0.191
State & year FE X X X
School composition controls X X X
School input controls X X X
Student level controls X X X
Notes: Each column within a panel reports results from a separate
regression of the outcome in the column header on the variables in the
leftmost column.All regressions include state, year, and test booklet
fixed e↵ects. School compositions controls include a categorical vari-
able for the size of the municipality in which the school is located
(in 6 categories); class-level averages of parents’ years of education,
highest ISEI, books at home; percent of students in class with a any
learning disability, special-needs status, migration background, male,
non-native German speakers, grade repeater. School input controls
include school enrolment, a private school indicator, controls for the
type of full-day o↵er in 4 categories (no full-day program, binding
full-day, partly binding full-day, open full-day program), grade 4 in-
struction hours in math and German; years of experience of the Ger-
man and math teacher. Student-level controls include indicators for
any learning disability, special-needs status, migration background,
male, non-native German speakers, grade repeater; years spent in
public childcare, linear and quadratic age at test; mother’s and fa-
ther’s highest years of education, highest ISES, country of birth in 5
categories (Germany, Poland, Russia, Turkey, other), work status in




B.1 Controlling for compositional di↵erences in the di↵erence-
in-di↵erences
Here we check whether time varying compositional di↵erences within states over time
bias our DiD results. This could happen, for example, through non-linearities in the
relationship between the class composition and student achievement. Table B.1 therefore
shows results for specifications with di↵erent ways to control for compositional di↵erences.
The estimates in column 1 are taken from our preferred specification, that is the model
reported in column 4 of Table 4. The first variation on this specification in column 2 adds
quadratic terms for all demographic class-level controls. The next specification in column
3 allows the class-level controls to di↵er by year and state. As a final check, we report
in column 4 results from a propensity score matching DiD estimator, following Heckman
et al. (1997) and Blundell et al. (2004).55 Our results are insensitive to these robustness
checks, suggesting that our parametric linear di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimator is e↵ective
in eliminating bias from compositional di↵erences.
B.2 Inference
In our student-level analyses, we estimate standard errors by clustering at the school level.
This is done to combat the false precision that arises if outcomes are correlated for children
within the same school. For example, due to the proverbial dog barking outside the class
room on the day of testing. To be more conservative, Table B.2 provides p-values for our
main test score results in Tables 4 and 6 based on standard errors clustered at state-year
level (column 3), the federal state level (column 4), and, since the number states is with
15 low, p-values based on the wild-cluster bootstrap procedure with varying weights (in
columns 4-9), testing under the null (columns 4, 6, and 8) and under the alternative
hypothesis (in columns 5, 7, and 9).56 As can be seen, our estimates remain statistically
significant using all procedures, with the exception of the reading results which sometimes
turn insignificant.
55Essentially, we extend propensity score matching by estimating two propensity scores—one for
binding track assignment and one for time period. Propensity scores are estimated using the same
class-level compositional controls as in Table 4. We then create a matched sample based on the two
propensity scores. That is, we match to the group of students in repeal states in the post-repeal period
three separate control groups (repeal states before the repeal and no-repeal states before and after the
repeal). These four groups are then used in a DiD design to control for time-invariant state fixed e↵ects.
This ensures that the class-composition distribution is the same in the four cells defined by binding
track assignment and time. We use the Stata-program di↵ by Villa (2016). In addition to the variables
specified in the estimation of the propensity score, we also include the same variables as those in our
preferred specification in column 4 of Table 4.
56We use the Stata-program BOOTTEST by Roodman et al. (2018) for all wild-cluster bootstrap
estimations with 999 replication.
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B.3 Jackknife leave-one-state-out results
Another concern is that our estimated e↵ects are driven by conditions specific to one par-
ticular state. To assuage this concern, we present in Figure B.1 estimated e↵ects on grade
4 test scores based on the lagged value added specification with full controls dropping
one state at a time. In all cases, the results are very similar or even more pronounced
compared to when using the full sample, and for math and orthography all estimated
coe cients are significant at the 1% level. We take the robustness of the negative track
choice coe cient across samples to be compelling evidence that our estimated impacts
are not driven by any particular state, but rather reflect a general pattern. Unfortunately,
we can not perform the same exercise with the DiD design as the group of repeal states
only consists of two states and we are legally prohibited from comparing groups of states
that consist of only one state.
B.4 Specifications with school factors
To assuage concerns that our lagged valued added results are confounded by di↵erences in
the schooling environment between choice and no-choice states, Table B.3 presents results
with extensive school environment controls. Since the number of variables describing
the schooling environment in the NEPS is vast, we reduce the dimensionality of this
information by forming factors based on principal components factor analysis and only
include factors for each battery of items with eigenvalues greater than one.57 Column 2
in Table B.3 adds to our preferred specification controls for factors describing teachers’
behavior (e.g., time devoted to certain classroom activities or teaching styles). In column
3, we control for factors describing the school (e.g., the quality of school facilities) and
in column 4 we control for a factors describing parents’ involvement with the school. In
Column 5, we control for all factors simultaneously. We consider these models to be
“over controlling” since many of these factors are potentially endogenous to students’
study e↵ort, but view the similarity of these estimates to that of our preferred models as
strong evidence that our main e↵ects are not driven by other di↵erences in the schooling
environment besides binding track assignment.
B.5 Cross-sectional estimates based on the NAS wave 2016
The NEPS and the second wave of the NAS tested the same cohort of students—those
who made the transition to a secondary school track in 2016. Moreover, the lagged value-
added results in Table 6 suggest that adding prior test score controls does not substantially
a↵ect point estimates in a cross-sectional comparison of states with and without track
choice when one regression adjusts for socio-demographic di↵erences. Hence, to check
the robustness of the NEPS results, we repeat the same analysis with the second wave of
57The factors and the items used to obtain them are reported in Sections D.4.1-D.4.3.
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the NAS for which prior test scores are not available. The results are shown in columns
1-4 in Table B.4. In the specification with the full set of controls in column 4, free track
choice is predicted to reduce math and reading test scores by 0.13 and 0.06 standard
deviations, respectively.58 Both e↵ects are significant at the 1% significance level and
similar to those based on the NEPS data. This limits concerns that the NEPS results
are driven by selective panel attrition in grade 4, which is not a problem in the NAS
since test participation was mandatory for all 4th grade students in the sampled public
schools. However, we do not find an e↵ect on listening test scores in the specification
with full controls, which was not tested in the NEPS.
58We use the same control variables as for the DiD approach in Table 4, but exclude state and year
fixed e↵ects.
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Table B.1: Alternative specifications: di↵erence-in-di↵erences
DiD Matching DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Math
Track choice -0.105*** -0.108*** -0.094** -0.112***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.044) (0.016)
N 47,039 47,039 47,039 47,035
Adj. R2 0.289 0.290 0.297
Panel B: Reading
Track choice -0.071** -0.077** -0.111*** -0.060***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.017)
N 46,075 46,075 46,075 46,073
Adj. R2 0.211 0.211 0.216
Panel C: Listening
Listening Track choice -0.099*** -0.103*** -0.090** -0.100***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.043) (0.017)
N 45,500 45,500 45,500 45,498
Adj. R2 0.211 0.211 0.216
State & year FE X X X X
School composition controls X X X X
Quadratic composition controls X
Interacted school composition controls X
School input controls X X X X
Student-level controls X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state, year, and test booklet fixed e↵ects. School
compositions controls include a categorical variable for the size of the municipality
in which the school is located (in 6 categories); class-level averages of parents’ years
of education, highest ISEI, books at home; percent of students in class with a any
learning disability, special-needs status, migration background, male, non-native
German speakers, grade repeater. School input controls include school enrolment,
a private school indicator, controls for the type of full-day o↵er in 4 categories (no
full-day program, binding full-day, partly binding full-day, open full-day program),
grade 4 instruction hours in math and German; years of experience of the Ger-
man and math teacher. Student-level controls include indicators for any learning
disability, special-needs status, migration background, male, non-native German
speakers, grade repeater; years spent in public childcare, linear and quadratic age
at test; mother’s and father’s highest years of education, highest ISES, country of
birth in 5 categories (Germany, Poland, Russia, Turkey, other), work status in 4
categories (full-time, part-time, not employed, other), EGP class in 11 categories.
Column 2 additional includes quadratic of all school composition controls. Column
3 includes interactions of all school composition controls with the year and state.
Column 4 presents results for a propensity score matching DiD estimator, where all
school composition controls are used to estimate the propensity score. Significance
level: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.2: Alternative ways of statistical inference
Cluster Wild cluster bootstrap
School State ⇥ year State Webb Mammen Rademacher
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Di↵erence-in-di↵erences
Math -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.105
p-value 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.084 0.003 0.070 0.001 0.081 0.005
Reading -0.075 -0.075 -0.075 -0.075 -0.075 -0.075 -0.075 -0.075 -0.075
p-value 0.029 0.041 0.158 0.131 0.241 0.069 0.182 0.148 0.224
Listening -0.101 -0.101 -0.101 -0.101 -0.101 -0.101 -0.101 -0.101 -0.101
p-value 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.102 0.020 0.041 0.002 0.072 0.016
Panel B: Lagged valued-added
Math -0.141 -0.141 -0.141 -0.141 -0.141 -0.141 -0.141 -0.141 -0.141
p-value 0.000 0.012 0.018 0.067 0.007 0.064 0.019 0.052
Reading -0.071 -0.071 -0.071 -0.071 -0.071 -0.071 -0.071 -0.071 -0.071
p-value 0.044 0.121 0.078 0.169 0.074 0.154 0.061 0.166
Orthography -0.199 -0.199 -0.199 -0.199 -0.199 -0.199 -0.199 -0.199 -0.199
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000
Notes: The table displays free track choice coe cients and their p-values based
on alternative procedures for inference for the main DiD and lagged valued-
added specifications. Panel A is based on the specification in column 4 in Table
4. Panel B is based on the specification in column 2 in Table 6. Columns 1-3
implement clustered standard errors, where the level of clustering is the school,
state-year, and state. The p-values in columns 4-9 are based on wild cluster
bootstrap procedures with states as clusters and varying weights. Testing is
one-sided under the null hypothesis in columns 4, 6, and 8. Testing is one-sided
under the alternative hypothesis in columns 5, 7, and 9. All estimations are
performed using the user-written Stata-program BOOTTEST (Roodman et al.,
2018) with 999 bootstrap iterations.
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Main spec. Point estimate 95% CI 90% CI
Orthography
Notes: This figures plots estimates, and 90% and 95% confidence intervals for the track choice
coe cient in equation (2) for the specification in column 2 in Table 6 if one drops any state.
The estimates are ordered by coe cient size. The diamonds correspond to estimates for the
full sample with no state excluded. Source: NEPS.
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Table B.3: Robustness check with additional controls: Main results lagged
value-added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Math
Track choice -0.136*** -0.137*** -0.127*** -0.136*** -0.133***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
N 4,800 4,800 4,800 4,800 4,800
Adj. R2 0.515 0.514 0.515 0.514 0.514
Panel B: Reading
Track choice -0.062* -0.065* -0.069* -0.065* -0.079**
(0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
N 4,798 4,798 4,798 4,798 4,798
Adj. R2 0.429 0.431 0.430 0.429 0.432
Panel C: Orthography
Track choice -0.205*** -0.186*** -0.200*** -0.205*** -0.192***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
N 4,533 4,533 4,533 4,533 4,533
Adj. R2 0.567 0.569 0.568 0.567 0.570
School & class controls X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X
Grade 2 test score controls X X X X X
Teacher PCA controls X X
School environment PCA controls X X
Parent PCA controls X X
Notes: Each cell of the table reports results from a separate regression of the re-
spective test score on an indicator for free track choice. School and class controls
include community size (in 7 categories), settlement structure (in 11 categories),
school enrolment, number of schools within 10 km radius, a private school indica-
tor, number of teachers at school, share of full-time teachers at school, share of
teachers at the school in each of the following age categories: below 35, between 35
and below 45, between 45 and 55, between 55 and below 65, and 65 or older; class
size, grade 2-3 instruction hours in math and German; the first principal compo-
nent of the class teacher’s qualifications grades, indicators for whether lessons are
taught by more than one teacher, whether there is additional socio-educational or
special educational needs sta↵ in the class. Student controls include sex, indicators
for early or late schol enrolment, premature birth, Dyslexia, migration background,
grade repetition, mother and father’s years of education and ISEI, reported books
at home, number of siblings, and marital status (in 5 categories). Grade 2 test score
controls include cubic functions of math, reading, and cognition test scores, and
teacher assessments of students’ social skills, persistence and ability to concentrate,
language skills in German, written language skills, science knowledge, and mathe-
matical skills (each measured in 5 categories). The PCA controls are all factors with
eigenvalue greater than one reported in Appendix D.4.1-D.4.3. Significance level: *
p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.4: Robustness: Cross-state comparison based on
NAS wave 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Math
Track choice -0.264*** -0.125*** -0.138*** -0.127***
(0.028) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
N 23,807 23,807 23,807 23,807
Panel B: Reading
Track choice -0.153*** -0.052** -0.068*** -0.061***
(0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
N 23,310 23,310 23,310 23,310
Panel C: Listening
Track choice -0.106*** -0.017 -0.033 -0.027
(0.029) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
N 22,710 22,710 22,710 22,710
School composition controls X X X
School input controls X X
Student-level controls X
Notes: Each cell of the table reports results from a separate regres-
sion of the respective test score on an indicator for free track choice.
All regressions include test booklet fixed e↵ects. School compo-
sitions controls include a categorical variable for the size of the
municipality in which the school is located (in 6 categories); class
level averages of parents’ years of education, highest ISEI, books at
home; percent of students in class with a disability, special-needs
status, migration background; percent of male students; percent of
non-native German speakers; percent of students who speak mostly
German at home; percent of students who have repeated a grade.
School input controls include school enrolment, a private school in-
dicator, controls for the type of full-day o↵er in 4 categories (no full-
day program, binding full-day, partly binding full-day, open full-day
program), grade 4 instruction hours in math and German; years of
experience of the German and math teacher. Student-level controls
include indicators for male, German spoken at home, non-native
German speaker, migrant background, born in Germany, grade re-
peater, grade skipper, any disability; years spent in public childcare,
linear and quadratic age at test; mother’s and father’s highest years
of education, highest ISES, country of birth in 5 categories (Ger-
many, Poland, Russia, Turkey, other), work status in 4 categories
(full-time, part-time, not employed, other), EGP class in 11 cate-
gories. Standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering at the
school level. Column 2 additional includes quadratic of all school
composition controls. Column 3 includes interactions of all school
composition controls with the year and state. Column 4 presents
results for a propensity score matching DiD estimator, where all
school composition controls are used to estimate the propensity
score. Significance level: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01.
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C School policies
In this section, we briefly describe three major education policy reforms that were im-
plemented in the years we investigate in Germany and that could have a↵ected early
achievement in primary school.
C.1 Early childcare expansion
Germany o↵ers public child care at two levels. Early child care is available for children
aged 0–2, and Kindergarten is available for children aged 3–6. Since 1996, every child
has been legally entitled to a place in Kindergarten from age 3 until primary school and
Kindergarten attendance rates for children aged 3-6 have been constant around 90% since
2005. Early child care, on the other hand, saw a rapid expansion in Germany beginning
in 2005. However, Panel A in Figure D.1 shows that the expansion of early child care
was roughly in parallel in repeal and no-repeal states.
C.2 Inclusion of special needs students
In 2009, Germany enacted the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities which states that persons with disabilities should be guaranteed the right to
inclusive education at all levels. Panel B in Figure D.1 shows that since then the gap
in the share of special needs students in regular schools between repeal and no-repeal
states has narrowed from 2 to .5 percentage points in 2017. This convergence is due to a
stronger increase in the inclusion rate in no-repeal states which started out with a lower
inclusion rates in 2009 compared to repeal states. However, these di↵erences are small in
magnitude and hence unlikely to drive our main e↵ects. Nevertheless, we include controls
for the share of special needs students in class in our DiD approach.
C.3 Full-day school reform
The German central government and federal states have invested massively in the expan-
sion of full-day schools since 2001 with the declared aim of reducing educational inequality
and improving the reconciliation of family and work life. Panel D of Figure D.1 shows that
the share of students in full-day schools has grown faster in no-repeal states compared
to repeal states between 2006 and 2017, raising concerns that di↵erent trends in full-day
school attendance could confound our DiD estimates. However, an important feature of
the full-day school expansion was that it happened gradually and di↵ered at the school
level as the responsibility of setting up full-day schools lay with the municipality (Shure,
2019). As a result, there is large variation in the expansion of full-day schools even within
states which allows us to control for it at the individual school level. Doing so does not
change our results (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 4).
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Notes: The group of repeal states consists of Baden-Württemberg and Saxony-Anhalt.
No-repeal states are Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bremen, Hesse, Rhineland-
Palatinate, Bavaria, Saarland, Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, and
Thuringia. Panel A plots the share of children in public childcare by age groups. Panel
B plots the inclusion rate which is defined as the share of special-needs students taught in
regular schools rather than schools for children with special-needs. Panel C plots class size in
primary school. Panel D plots the share of all primary school students enrollend in full-day
schools. Panel E plots the share of comprehensive schools among all secondary schools. The
data source for Panel A is the German Federal Statistical O ce. Specifically, data on the
number of children in childcare comes from: https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/
/online?operation=table&code=22541-0002&levelindex=0&levelid=1588851385135
(Retrieved: 01/13/2020). Data on the number of children in each age-group comes
from: https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis//online?operation=table&code=
12411-0012&levelindex=1&levelid=1588853841953 (Retrieved: 01/16/2020). The data
for Panel B comes from Knauf and Knauf (2019). The date source for Panels C and E
is the German Federal Statistical O ce: Allgemeinbildende Schulen Fachserie 11, Reihe
1: https://www.destatis.de/GPStatistik/receive/DEHeft_heft_00112288 (Retrieved:
01/16/2020). The data source for Panel D is the standing conference of the ministers of





Here, we perform principal component factor analysis for di↵erent sets of questionnaire
items to create factors that describe students’ intrinsic motivation, parenting styles, and
the schooling environment. As a decision rule for the factors to be included in the analysis
in Table B.3, we follow Kaiser’s criterion and only keep those factors with eigenvalues
greater than 1. The results for the eigenvalues and the mapping of questionnaire items
to the factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 are shown in the tables below.
D.1 Intrinsic motivation
Table D.1: The mapping of intrinsic motivation items to first principal-component
Comp1
Eagerness to learn 1: I like attending school. .3801852
Eagerness to learn 2: I enjoy school .3657373
Eagerness to learn 3: I enjoy learning at school very much. .3792075
Parent: Joy of learning 1: <name of target child> likes attending school. .4480518
Parent: Joy of learning 2: <name of target child> enjoys school. .4443316
Parent: Joy of learning 3: <name of target child> enjoys learning at school. .4443526
Feeling at school: bored -.5347926
Feeling at school: I enjoyed class .3232581
D.2 Parenting styles
Table D.2: Testing for the number of factors in parenting style measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 2.782587 1.637993 0.3975 0.3975
Comp2 1.144594 .3537433 0.1635 0.5610
Comp3 .7908505 .0573243 0.1130 0.6740
Comp4 .7335262 .0575553 0.1048 0.7788
Comp5 .6759709 .1935522 0.0966 0.8754
Comp6 .4824187 .0923655 0.0689 0.9443




















































































































































































































































































































































































Table D.4: Testing for the number of factors in teacher credentials
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 1.755859 .9631339 0.5853 0.5853
Comp2 .7927253 .3413098 0.2642 0.8495
Comp3 .4514155 . 0.1505 1.0000
Table D.5: The mapping of parental items to the teacher credential factor
Comp1
Grade of university entrance qualification .4746464
Grade in first state examination .6397937
Grade in second state examination .6044624
D.4 Determination of school environment factors for robustness
check
D.4.1 Teacher principal-components
Table D.6: Testing for the number of factors in classroom activities
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 1.848558 .4947116 0.2311 0.2311
Comp2 1.353847 .2605239 0.1692 0.4003
Comp3 1.093323 .1106796 0.1367 0.5370
Comp4 .9826431 .0543096 0.1228 0.6598
Comp5 .9283335 .0365148 0.1160 0.7758
Comp6 .8918187 .1429876 0.1115 0.8873
Comp7 .7488311 .5961849 0.0936 0.9809
Comp8 .1526462 . 0.0191 1.0000
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Table D.7: The mapping of classroom activies to factors
Comp1 Comp2 Comp3
Time spent each week - homework .388106 .1335385 .4555481
Time spent each week - lecture teacher .3337196 -.2044993 .4968003
Time spent each week - tasks/exercises with assistance .2274838 -.5190346 -.1177694
Time spent each week - tasks/exercises without assistance -.6635105 .0071501 .2629223
Time spent each week - repetitive drills and exercises .2955223 -.2770449 -.5497798
Time spent each week - tests, quizzes or guessing games .3123104 .2401403 .1253596
Time spent each week - classroom management .2420969 .4905609 .0045187
Time spent each week - other student activities .0502772 .5439009 -.3803608
Table D.8: Testing for the number of factors in teachers’ job satisfaction measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 3.652024 2.492871 0.4565 0.4565
Comp2 1.159154 .3761999 0.1449 0.6014
Comp3 .7829537 .1227434 0.0979 0.6993
Comp4 .6602103 .0936725 0.0825 0.7818
Comp5 .5665378 .1449623 0.0708 0.8526
Comp6 .4215755 .0418397 0.0527 0.9053
Comp7 .3797358 .0019269 0.0475 0.9528
Comp8 .3778089 . 0.0472 1.0000
Table D.9: The mapping of teachers’ job satisfaction measures to factors
Comp1 Comp2
Teacher: Professional pressure: Enjoy job -.3426858 .5294752
Teacher: Professional pressure: Considered leaving the profession .3079385 -.4966412
Teacher: Professional pressure: Satisfied with work -.3819497 .2713637
Teacher: Professional pressure: Professional ideals cannot be realized .2917555 -.0378445
Teacher: Professional pressure: Constantly overloaded .3983976 .277262
Teacher: Professional pressure: Cannot switch o↵ from job .3736666 .3910459
Teacher: Professional pressure: Responsibility puts me under great pressure .3259451 .1220959
Teacher: Professional pressure: Time pressure too great .3900588 .391452
Table D.10: Testing for the number of factors in teachers’ skill development measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 3.12846 2.688166 0.7821 0.7821
Comp2 .4402948 .1628571 0.1101 0.8922
Comp3 .2774377 .1236306 0.0694 0.9615
Comp4 .1538071 . 0.0385 1.0000
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Table D.11: The mapping of teachers’ skill development measures to factors
Comp1
Teacher: Skills development: Developed competencies in last five years .4759908
Teacher: Skills development: Teaching significantly improved in last five years .50548
Teacher: Skills development: Developed didactic knowledge in last five years .4945882
Teacher: Skills development: Learned a lot in the last five years (lessons) .522786
Table D.12: Testing for the number of factors in the first set of teaching styles measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 2.083193 .8579295 0.2976 0.2976
Comp2 1.225264 .2770702 0.1750 0.4726
Comp3 .9481935 .1609745 0.1355 0.6081
Comp4 .7872189 .0588102 0.1125 0.7206
Comp5 .7284087 .0950231 0.1041 0.8246
Comp6 .6333856 .0390491 0.0905 0.9151
Comp7 .5943365 . 0.0849 1.0000
Table D.13: The mapping of the first set of teaching styles measures to factors
Comp1 Comp2
I demand considerably less from students who are less capable. .3081349 -.2574456
I form groups of students with similar capabilities. .2490675 -.6068413
I form groups of students with di↵erent capabilities. .051335 .7106913
I assign homework with varying di culty to students. .4836976 .0117447
Faster students continue with their work, slower students still practice. .4135286 .1284812
If students don’t understand something we do dedicated additional exercises. .4556197 .1110094
I challenge capable students more. .4773096 .1772423
Table D.14: Testing for the number of factors in the second set of teaching styles measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 2.511853 1.004858 0.2284 0.2284
Comp2 1.506994 .4666153 0.1370 0.3653
Comp3 1.040379 .0386831 0.0946 0.4599
Comp4 1.001696 .087786 0.0911 0.5510
Comp5 .9139099 .0530825 0.0831 0.6341
Comp6 .8608274 .1380924 0.0783 0.7123
Comp7 .7227351 .0441929 0.0657 0.7780
Comp8 .6785422 .0208215 0.0617 0.8397
Comp9 .6577207 .0726793 0.0598 0.8995
Comp10 .5850414 .0647397 0.0532 0.9527
Comp11 .5203017 . 0.0473 1.0000
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Table D.15: The mapping of the second set of teaching styles measures to factors
Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4
Teacher: Teaching: di↵erentiated assignments .17673 .3941009 .5836551 -.0733348
Teacher: Teaching: quickly noticing trouble .2973317 .2169118 .3134146 -.2226329
Teacher: Teaching: knowing the rules .3309356 .0681771 .0519867 .3313106
Teacher: Teaching: repeating assignments .3364888 -.2657489 .2770581 -.0331024
Teacher: Teaching: discuss general topics .313651 .1097867 -.0820825 -.6370366
Teacher: Teaching: teach proven concepts .3223802 -.4595981 -.1424452 -.1434558
Teacher: Teaching: summarize material .339955 -.3887769 .012668 -.1254873
Teacher: Teaching: asking for justifications .2950808 .2008882 -.5589497 -.0409272
Teacher: Teaching: quiet classes .2817987 -.2807327 .1486585 .5256419
Teacher: Teaching: identifying mistakes .3092068 .3284462 -.344522 .1661602
Teacher: Teaching: extra tasks for faster students .2786576 .34769 -.0352989 .2940548
Table D.16: Testing for the number of factors in the third set of teaching styles measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 1.949359 .2181744 0.2437 0.2437
Comp2 1.731185 .8349468 0.2164 0.4601
Comp3 .8962383 .0982682 0.1120 0.5721
Comp4 .7979701 .0479607 0.0997 0.6718
Comp5 .7500093 .0615138 0.0938 0.7656
Comp6 .6884956 .0593411 0.0861 0.8517
Comp7 .6291545 .0715669 0.0786 0.9303
Comp8 .5575876 . 0.0697 1.0000
Table D.17: The mapping of the third set of teaching styles measures to factors
Comp1 Comp2
Teacher: Opinion: Make decisions -.4256848 .2285789
Teacher: Opinion: Role of teacher with regard to investigating and exploring .1950975 .4526778
Teacher: Opinion: Learning through independent problem-solving .4607761 .2934843
Teacher: Opinion: Lessons with clear answers -.2833438 .4581431
Teacher: Opinion: Teaching of facts -.3595482 .3765329
Teacher: Opinion: Possibility of independent problem-solving .4320361 .3340418
Teacher: Opinion: Quiet classroom -.2568858 .3532776
Teacher: Opinion: Thinking and reasoning processes .3258996 .2619929
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D.4.2 School environment principal-components
Table D.18: Testing for the number of factors in facility quality
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 2.943625 1.95581 0.4906 0.4906
Comp2 .9878146 .2368979 0.1646 0.6552
Comp3 .7509167 .1354478 0.1252 0.7804
Comp4 .6154688 .1928814 0.1026 0.8830
Comp5 .4225874 .1429996 0.0704 0.9534
Comp6 .2795878 . 0.0466 1.0000
Table D.19: The mapping of facility quality items to the facility quality factor
Comp1
Class: Facilities: Classroom size (aggregated) .1460446
Class: Classroom condition, brightness .4013457
Class: Classroom condition, size .4383296
Class: Classroom condition, functionality .4884833
Class: Classroom condition, structural integrity .454125
Class: Classroom condition, acoustics .4249874
Table D.20: Testing for the number of factors in school climate measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 3.73435 2.568829 0.6224 0.6224
Comp2 1.165521 .7233172 0.1943 0.8166
Comp3 .4422042 .1223115 0.0737 0.8903
Comp4 .3198927 .0956492 0.0533 0.9437
Comp5 .2242435 .1104557 0.0374 0.9810
Comp6 .1137878 . 0.0190 1.0000
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Table D.21: The mapping of school climate measures to factors
Comp1 Comp2
Teacher: School climate: Conflicts open and constructive .3801852 .3519051
Teacher: School climate: Teachers mutual help and practical support .3657373 .4720067
Teacher: School climate: Atmosphere of trust .3792075 .4780671
Teacher: School climate: Teachers have faith in skills of students .4480518 -.2885274
Teacher: School climate: Teachers have faith in willingness to learn of students .4443316 -.4012073
Teacher: School climate: Have faith in students’ willingness to make e↵orts .4239293 -.4249811
Table D.22: Testing for the number of factors in school culture measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 3.765089 2.686881 0.6275 0.6275
Comp2 1.078208 .6289038 0.1797 0.8072
Comp3 .4493044 .1968947 0.0749 0.8821
Comp4 .2524097 .0080756 0.0421 0.9242
Comp5 .2443341 .0336799 0.0407 0.9649
Comp6 .2106542 . 0.0351 1.0000
Table D.23: The mapping of school culture measures to factors
Comp1 Comp2
Teacher: School culture: Clear pedagogical goals – binding for all .4177294 -.4117596
Teacher: School culture: Agreement teachers/school management with learning goal .4211118 -.3953834
Teacher: School culture: Teachers clear about learning goals .4404828 -.3380583
Teacher: School culture: Faculty place high demands on the students .3953836 .27562
Teacher: School culture: Teachers attach great importance to e↵orts of students .4013163 .4729206
Teacher: School culture: Teachers convey students – e↵ort .3698094 .5101199
Table D.24: Testing for the number of factors in school management measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 5.673921 4.983234 0.8106 0.8106
Comp2 .6906868 .4839817 0.0987 0.9092
Comp3 .2067051 .0610539 0.0295 0.9388
Comp4 .1456512 .0205109 0.0208 0.9596
Comp5 .1251403 .0284995 0.0179 0.9774
Comp6 .0966408 .0353856 0.0138 0.9912
Comp7 .0612552 . 0.0088 1.0000
Table D.25: The mapping of school management measures to factors
Comp1
Teacher: Management: School management manages very well .3893949
Teacher: School management: Leads the school e ciently and goal-oriented .3882421
Teacher: Management: School management organizes very well .3865541
Teacher: Management: School management e cient administration of the school .385921
Teacher: Information evaluation: Good information flow .3673509
Teacher: Information evaluation: Relevant information provided in time .3650379
Teacher: Information evaluation: Su cient sharing for important decisions .3620515
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Table D.26: Testing for the number of factors in teachers’ constraints measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 2.537873 1.644103 0.5076 0.5076
Comp2 .8937695 .0835862 0.1788 0.6863
Comp3 .8101833 .3244709 0.1620 0.8484
Comp4 .4857124 .2132503 0.0971 0.9455
Comp5 .2724621 . 0.0545 1.0000
Table D.27: The mapping of teachers’ constraints measures to factors
Comp1
Teacher: Decision making constrained by: Ministry of education .3321538
Teacher: Decision making constrained by: School management .5070176
Teacher: Decision making constrained by: Teacher/comprehensive conference .5146473
Teacher: Decision making constrained by: Student body .4392568
Teacher: Decision making constrained by: Parents .4180894
Table D.28: Testing for the number of factors in teachers’ school involvement measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 2.737342 1.350368 0.2488 0.2488
Comp2 1.386974 .1139429 0.1261 0.3749
Comp3 1.273031 .3364388 0.1157 0.4907
Comp4 .9365921 .0230548 0.0851 0.5758
Comp5 .9135373 .0959593 0.0830 0.6589
Comp6 .817578 .0912944 0.0743 0.7332
Comp7 .7262836 .1125439 0.0660 0.7992
Comp8 .6137396 .0365463 0.0558 0.8550
Comp9 .5771933 .0212668 0.0525 0.9075
Comp10 .5559266 .0941236 0.0505 0.9580
Comp11 .461803 . 0.0420 1.0000
Table D.29: The mapping of teachers’ school involvement measures to factors
Comp1 Comp2 Comp3
Participation: teacher conferences .3334724 .2185579 -.4540678
Participation: development of school curriculum .3079677 .1829208 -.520668
Participation: discussing/decisions on media teaching .3290743 -.0777018 -.3573447
Participation: exchange of teaching materials .2451245 -.5088302 .0150429
Participation: team discussions .3124801 -.4254904 .1772221
Participation: discussion about learning process of individual students .3239088 -.3524304 .0995537
Participation: team teaching in a class .264029 .1354085 .3970559
Participation: professional learning activities .3104576 .2961224 .3061027
Participation: sitting in on classes .2996432 .3680211 .2721089
Participation: joint activities across di↵erent grades .2442405 .2998474 .1584011
Participation: discussion/coordination of homework .3278424 -.1311695 .0547798
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Table D.30: Testing for the number of factors in the third set of teaching styles measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 2.744717 1.978405 0.5489 0.5489
Comp2 .7663122 .1357564 0.1533 0.7022
Comp3 .6305558 .1511824 0.1261 0.8283
Comp4 .4793734 .1003318 0.0959 0.9242
Comp5 .3790416 . 0.0758 1.0000
Table D.31: The mapping of the third set of teaching styles measures to factors
Comp1
Teacher: Cover: Well-organized cover plan .4269793
Teacher: Cover: Replacement lessons by specialist teachers .4438474
Teacher: Cover: Contents of replacement lessons discussed .5008795
Teacher: Cover: Canceled lesson – working material available .454463
Teacher: Cover: Responsibilities clearly regulated .4040683
Table D.32: Testing for the number of factors in school decision-making process measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 5.962291 4.892473 0.6625 0.6625
Comp2 1.069818 .3731815 0.1189 0.7813
Comp3 .6966361 .3373709 0.0774 0.8587
Comp4 .3592653 .108451 0.0399 0.8987
Comp5 .2508143 .0276483 0.0279 0.9265
Comp6 .223166 .0582567 0.0248 0.9513
Comp7 .1649093 .0113614 0.0183 0.9697
Comp8 .1535479 .0339954 0.0171 0.9867
Comp9 .1195525 . 0.0133 1.0000
Table D.33: The mapping of school decision-making process measures to factors
Comp1 Comp2
Teacher: Decision-making processes: School council fast decisions .3035316 .5250325
Teacher: Decision-making processes: School council process very e cient .3373394 .4149928
Teacher: Decision-making processes: School decisions goal-oriented .3433302 .3009148
Teacher: Decision-making processes: Joint decisions among colleagues .341928 .0062562
Teacher: Decision-making processes: School decisions rarely criticism .3034443 .0919795
Teacher: Decision-making processes: Important decisions are accepted by teachers .3393176 -.1185401
Teacher: Decision-making processes: All teachers involved in important decisions .3410277 -.3928958
Teacher: Decision-making processes: Opinions of faculty for important decisions .3354744 -.3929523
Teacher: Decision-making processes: Faculty key role in important decisions .3510306 -.3608911
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Table D.34: Testing for the number of factors in teachers’ opinion of colleagues measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 3.4834 2.771279 0.5806 0.5806
Comp2 .7121203 .1150135 0.1187 0.6993
Comp3 .5971069 .0963864 0.0995 0.7988
Comp4 .5007205 .0897435 0.0835 0.8822
Comp5 .410977 .1153014 0.0685 0.9507
Comp6 .2956756 . 0.0493 1.0000
Table D.35: The mapping of teachers’ opinion of colleagues measures to factors
Comp1
Teacher: Opinion of colleagues: objections to change -.40529
Teacher: Opinion of colleagues: readiness to evaluate teaching methods .3851947
Teacher: Opinion of colleagues: openness to new teaching methods .4379974
Teacher: Opinion of colleagues: lack of readiness to learn new things -.3600697
Teacher: Opinion of colleagues: e↵ort to define school’s pedagogical concept .4236833
Teacher: Opinion of colleagues: renewal and development .4317008
D.4.3 Parent principal-components
Table D.36: Testing for the number of factors in cooperation with parent measures
Eigenvalue Di↵erence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 3.031953 1.827471 0.3790 0.3790
Comp2 1.204483 .2198805 0.1506 0.5296
Comp3 .9846022 .2342561 0.1231 0.6526
Comp4 .7503461 .1197133 0.0938 0.7464
Comp5 .6306327 .100453 0.0788 0.8253
Comp6 .5301797 .0195239 0.0663 0.8915
Comp7 .5106558 .1535082 0.0638 0.9554
Comp8 .3571476 . 0.0446 1.0000
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Table D.37: The mapping of cooperation with parent measures to factors
Comp1 Comp2
Teacher: Working with parents: Fun .2442994 .4032812
Teacher: Working with parents: Parents as partners .378373 .2563513
Teacher: Working with parents: Info about school events .3712089 -.2070268
Teacher: Working with parents: Follow up on complaints .4215019 .1145481
Teacher: Working with parents: Info about strengths/weaknesses .4300077 -.3330645
Teacher: Working with parents: Info about learning progress .347918 -.4995927
Teacher: Working with parents: Appointments .362355 .069906
Teacher: Working with parents: Speaking outside of school .210801 .5918236
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